- 1106 ARNETT v. STATE. -[188 ARNETT V. STATE. Crim. 3874 Opinion _delivered March 19, 1.934. 1. CRIMINAL LAW—CONCLUSIVENESS OF VERDICT.—A finding of the jury upon a disputed question of fact is binding upOn the. Supreme Court. 2. EMBEIzzLEMENT—OWNERSHIP OF MORTGAGED COTTO N .—A mortgagor of cotton was the "owner" thereof so as to render an agent intrusted with the cotton to pay the mortgaged debt guilty of embezzlement by misappropriating it. 3. ' E MBEIZZLEMENT—M ISAPPROPRIATION BY AGE NT.—Where an agent misappropriated to his own use the proceeds of cotton intrusted to his care for the purpose of paying his principal's debt, he is guilty of embezzlement. 4. E MBEZZLEMENT—DEFINITION.—Embezzlernent is the fraudulMit appropriation to one's own use of property intrusted to one's care. 5. E MBEZZLEMENT—MISAPPROPRIATION.—In a prosecution for embezzlement, evidence that accused, who bought cotton from a mortgagor, was. intrusted with part of the proceeds to pay the mortgage debt and appropriated the money to his own use held to sustain a conviction. Appeal from Independence Circuit Court; S. M. Bone, Judge; affirmed. W. M. Thompson, for appellant. Hal L. Norwood, Attorney G-eneral, and Robert F: Smith, Assistant, for appellee. BUTLER, J. From a conviction on the charge of embezzling the property of F. C. O'Neal, F. E. Arnett prosecutes this appeal on the sole ground that the evidence was not legally sufficient to warrant the submission of the case to the ;jury. This contention is based on the theory that the. evidence fails to show (1) - that the
' ARK.] ARNETT V. STATE. • 1107 .p -roperty embezzled was that of O'Neal; and (2) that the "relation 'Of principal and agent was not established by -pe evidence. These contentions are not tenable. • . • - The evidence introduced on the part of the State tended to establish the following facts : O'Neal had procured a loan from the United States Government in the sum of $60, which was secured by a chattel mortgage on the crops of cotton he might raise during the year in which the loan was procured. He produced three bales of cotton which he sold and delivered to Arnett with the understanding that the latter would pay to the Government's agent the $60, Arnett having paid O'Neal the difference, between said sum and the purchase price. .Arnett disposed of the cotton, collected the proceeds, and failed to pay the Government the $60 appropriating it to his own use. Arnett testified that he had not appropriated the money, but had paid it to the cotton broker Who had purchased the cotton from him, for transmission to the Government. The jury found against the appellant on the dis-,puted question of . fact, and, it being the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses, its judgment is binding. upon -us. The • appellant cannot escape criminal liability on the ground that 0-Weal, having executed a chattel mortgage on the cotton, was not the owner Of the saane. He had the right of possession with the power to sell the cotton and discharge the mortgage by the payment of the debt it was given to secure. ' There is also no merit in the claim that Arnett-was _ not the agent of O'Neal, •but of the Government in the tranSaction. There is no intimatien in the testimony that he secured possession of • the• cotton and retained the $60 by any authority derived from the Government, but clearly was acting for O'Neal and as his agent. Embezzleniefit ' is the . fraudulent appropriation 'to one's 'own use of property of another intrusted to his care. , The evidence found to be true by the jaiiy establishes that this iS precisely what Arnett did. The evidence is clear that O'Neal sold and delivered the cotton to Arnett at a specified price receiving a part of the proceeds and intrusting the remainder to Arnett to pay to
the Government; that Arnett in.turn sold the cotton and appropriated the $60 to his own_use, and under the rule • announced in Gurley v. Stat . e, 179 Ark. 1149; . 20 S. W. (2d) 886, the jury was warranted in finding the . appellant guilty as charged. Let the judgment be affirmed.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.