ARK.] STANDARD PIPE LINE CO. V. BURNETT. 491 STANDARD PIPE LINE COMPANY V. BURNETT. 4-3245
Opinion. delivered December 18, 1933. 1. MASTER AND SERVANT—QUESTIONS FOR JURY.—In an employee's action against his employer for oil poisoning sustained in obeying his foreman's instruction to clean an oil pumping station, evidence held to sustain a finding that the master was negligent •and that the employee was not cOntributorily negligent and did not assume the risk. • 2. EVIDENCE—SUFFICIENCY.—Where evidence tends equally to sustain two inconsistent positions, a verdict in favor of the party bound to maintain one of them against the other cannot be maintained. 3. NEGLIGENCE—SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.—The causal connection between the alleged cause of action and the injurY arising therefrom must be proved by evidence and not be left to • mere specu-latidn. 4. MASTER AND SERVANT—PERSONAL INJURIES—WHAT LAW GOVERNS. —In an action by an employee on a cause which arose in this State against a Louisiana corporate employer, defense that the employee contracted with the employer that any injury was to be compensated under the Louisiana • Workmen's Compensation Act is precluded by Crawford & Moses' Dig., § 7147. 5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—EXEMPTION OF LIABILITY FOR CORP:ORATE NEGLIGENCE.—Criwford & Moses' 'Dig., §• 7147, precluding any contract exempting a corporate employer from liability to an ern-'ployee for -its negligence, _held not unconstitutional. as denying to corporations equal protection, freedom' of contract or . dile process. 6. MASTER AND; SERVANT—CONTRACT EXEMPTION.—A contract .of an employee of a Louisiana Corporation to accept compensation under the Louisiana Compensation Act, for injOries received in Arkansas held against public policy, as expressed in Crawford & Moses' Dig., § 7147, where the employee was required to agree to work under the Louisiana act to secure employment.
. _ -492: STANDOD—PIPE:LINE BU-R-NETIT. [--1SS-MASTER ANO . SERVANT-PERSONAL INJURIEST -LIMITING RECOVERY. • —A contract of an Arkansas employee of a Louisiana corpora-accept compensation for injuries . received in this State Under :the.louisiana Compensation Act held void as limiting the amount of the employer's -liability under Crawford & -Moses' Dig., § 7147 and Const., art. 5, § 23. MASTER ANTI SERVANT—RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL. 7-A contract of an • Arkansas employee of a Louisiana corporation to accept com-pensntion for injuries received in Arkansas under the Louisiana Compensation Act held invalid as depriving the employee of the right to trial by jury, under Const., art. 2, § 7. Appeal from Union Circuit Court, Second Division; W. A. Speer, j udgeT affirmed. T. M. Milling and Gaughan, Siff ord., Godwin & Gaughan, for appellant. T. P. Oliver And McNalley & Seller's, for appellee. .BUTLE11,. J. The appellant is a corporation organized under the laws . of the State of Louisiana. .The appellee is a resident of the State .of Arkansas, and the 'alleged injury out of' which - this litigation. arose .was suStained in Union County, Arkansas, on the 19th day of May, 1930. The appellee alleged in *substance that he Was in -the emPloy of the appellant company On the 19th day ,of May, 1930, and on that day was directed by his iore-man to go into .an oil pumping station of the appellant to assist in cleaning the same ; that the station had been flooded by overflow waters which brought and deposited Within the station, acids, caustics and other poisonous sUbstances-; that appellee was inexperienced and unaware of any danger to be apprehended-from the fluids in the pumping station coining in contact with his body, and that he was assured by the foreman, when he inquired if it was_necessary to use boots, that there was no danger in remoVing the water anct slush from the basement of the pumping station, whereas appellant knew, or in the exercise of ordinary_ care ought to , have known,. that the water and the sediment was dangerous, and would result harmfully to those working therein Unless their bodies were protected-, and that,. appellant was, negligent in directing appellee to work therein without affording him some means- hy which he might be
STAND4RD PIPE. LINE CO. V.. BURNETT. 49,3 protected from the :deleterious. fluids ;. that, because of his 'Norking . in • the pumping station in removing „the accumulated water . and . deposits, the..same . catne, in contact with his skin,..and. that he contracted oil poisoning 'on his hand's and arms, totally and permanently:disabling him, to.recover damages for: which his suit , was instituted. • . The defense tendered' by . .the answer waS A. general -denial of the allegations of the Complaint, and the affirmative defenses of assuMed riSk -and contribntory . negligence. As a further defense, . it was alleged that the appellee had .• entered into a. written contract ..with :the appellant; whereby it was agreed :that, in the. event. :of any : injury occurring during .the . course of •his employment,• compensation should he . made under •the provisions of the Workmen 's .CompenSation . Act of: the State Of Louisiana. This' contract • was pleaded -. as .A ., complete defense to the action; to which , a special demurrer was interposed; and sustained over the objections : of appel:- lant. From a - verdict and judgment hi. favor • .of the appellee, the appellant 'has aPpealed. • It is insisted , that the 'Court erred in 'refusing to dire, ct a verdict in faver, of the .appellant; firSt, 1366a-use the .evidence, Nikved in its most_ faVerable light, doeS net warrant the submisSion of . the . cASe tO the jury, aS , there was no evidence, shoWing - negligence . on :the part of.:the appellant, or that the Water corning 'in contact :With' , ap- pellee's body while . he , was engaged in cleaning . Out the' puniping station was . the prainfate, , cause of the:in-jurY alleged to haVe-‘been . sUstained, and . that he was . ' aWaie of .whatever danger existed, and Was able tO jUdge the probahle conseqUences,.. ag mien aS' . his forenfan..:. ;., The evidence relating te the .'negligence: of the appellant complained of,.-and as to..whethet or not,..if established, it was the cause of the injury,,is in conflict. With-, out :discussing this evidenceJ.n detail, .suffice, it to say that: viewed in its : most ..,faverable• light it• tended to establish the fact that,. bef ore ; the 'date . of the. ..Alleged : injury, the :appellee was a healthy.man,' and. had never had any disease - of the 'skin; that he had been in the -employ
•- 494 -STA-N DIED PIPE - LINE' CO. - BURNETT. • [188 of oil companies for a number of years- engaged-in doing general work in the oil fields, which included that of fitting pipes and carpenter work, but that he had never had occasion to work whei . e the conditions were similar to those which existed at the pumping station on the date of his injury, and that he did. not• know that chemicals from refining plants were 'likely to pollute the water within the pumping station. There was evidence also to the effect that the appellant's foreman knew• Of refining plants situated it short distance above this .pumping station, and that ordinarily the waste from the:.same would drain through a depression, but that he also knew that about the time of the injury complained of there had been a good deal of complaint of oil poisoning, and 'that the waters from the depression through which the waste would nsually flow spread out over the territory nearby, and over the pumping station; that the appel-lee was directed to work in the station and to bale out • the accumulation of water and sediment therein, -and was assured there was no danger in doing this ; :that he was engaged in this work . for perhaps two days ; that within a .short time..after completing this work his ,hand and arm began to ifeh and burn, and in about tWo or three weeks broke out in small pustules, the infection continuing to spread and increase in intensity until it became such that he made complaint, and was direeted tO go to a physician who diagnosed his trouble as oil poisoning. It was also in proof that some persdns . were not a's susceptible to oil poisoning as others, and that One part of a person's s skin would be more susCeptible to oil poisoning than another part, and that • the* condition from which the . appellee suffered would be produced by contact with- caustic chemicals -coming from refining sta-. tiOns. -8everal employees of the appellant, who- Worked in the station with the appellee, also :contracted oil poisoning, *while others did not. There is no -*evidence to , m1i6V Q-' that, between the time of the. baling opetationS and the discovery Of the irritation on.:the hand anctairn of the appellee, he worked at • any 'place where he would have been likely to contract oil poisoning; but
ARK.] . STANDAIW PIPE LINE CO. V. BURNETT. 495 that for a time after .the date of his alleged injury he worked around the_ station doing odd jobs, such as cutting grass, fitting pipes, etc., .from which there was nothing likely to create the condition to his skin. _ This evidenCe is legally sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury, both on the question of negligence . on the part of the appellant, and the lack of contributory negligence of the appellee, and . warrants the submission to the jury of the question of assuniption of risk. We recognize, and adhere to the rule announced in Railway Co. v. ITendersoti,. 57 Ark. 402, 21 S. W. 578, and in Biddle v. Jacobs, 116 Ark. 82, 172 . S. W. 258, that where evidence tends equally to sustan two inconsistent propositions, a verdict in favor of the party bound to maintain one of them against the other is necessarily wrong, and . that verdicts cannot be predicated upon conjecture, but. that the . causal 'connection between . the al-le-ged cause, -and the injury said to arise therefrom, must be proved by evidence, and not left to mere speculation. We are Of the opinion that these doctrines are- not applicable in the instant case, for, while there is no direct . proof of the cause of the injury, the evidence establishes circumstances from which these facts may be inferred. • • 1. To the defense that appellee was precluded . from a recovery because of the contract entered into -between him and the appellant by which any injury. was to be compensated , in,the manner and in the amounts fixed by the Workmen's Compensation. Act of Louisiana, the ap-pellee interposed a special demurrer which was suStained by the court. This ruling, it is strongly insisted, was erroneous on_ the theory that the contract was a . voluntary mutual agreement, fair in its provisions, and which in no way attempted to * limit the. liability for the injury, and therefore was not against the policy of this State as expressed by the ConstitUtion - and § 7147 of Crawford & Moses' Digest, and that to construe the statute last cited as prohibiting the appellant from making a.-Contract of the nature pleaded would he unconstitutional as denying if equal, protection of the law, and that it denies
-496_ --STANDAiD- PIPE -LLN-E• . CC1 V. BURNETT. 1188- freedom-of contract and conflicts 'with the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. • Thii argument is advanced because § 7147, supra, limits its application to corporations, except those engaged in interstate commerce, and does not apply to individuals or partnerships. To sustain its contention, the appellant cites Chicag6; etc., Ry. Co. v. State, 86 Ark: 412, 111 S. W. 456, and Prudential Insurance Co. v. -Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, but those cases recognize the hindamental difference between natural and artificial persons and that tbose provisions in our own Constitution and the Constitution , of the United States; by which laws are s forbidden denying any person equal protection, or which do not secure equal privileges and immunities, do not relate to corporations, because these do not exist naturally, -but are the creatures of law, possessing only §tich powers as are granted • them, and making only such 'contracts as they are authorized to enter into, and that' wherever an' act is general and uniforth in its operation upon all perSons coming within the . class to which 'it applieS, it 'does not come within 'the prohibition of the Constitution. We have . many times upheld the validity of acts relating to corporations, limiting their rights beyond those of natural persons for' the reason . that a, citizen or natural person has the inherent right, independent of any legislation, to contract, while the cOrporation is clothed only with 0=tch power as may be given'it by the legiSlative will, and this may be altered, revoked, or annulled at the pleasure of the Legislature, 'and terms prescribed under which they may conduct their business, the only limitation upon its power being that it may not interfere with any vested right of the corporation- or its incorporators, or violate. any fundamental principle of natural justice-. .-On this principle, the Supreme Court of the United States -and this court have often upheld the validity of such legislation. -Little Rock & Ft. Smith Rd. v. Eubantks, 48 -Ark. 460, 3 S. W. 808 ; Leep v. Ry. Co., 58 Ark. 407, 25 S. W. 75, 23 L. R. A. 264,41 Am. St. Rep. 109 ; McKee v. American Trust Co.,- 166 Ark. 480; 266 S. W. 293 . ; Pru-
ARK.] STANDARD PIPE LINE CO. V. BURNETT. . 497 'dential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 N. S. 530, 42 S. Ct. 516, 66 L..Ed. 1044. • 2. We next consider the question as to whether:or not the contract relied upon is against the • 'M o bile policy of this State and whether for that reason it is or iS not void. As a part of the preamble to the contract the following . language. is employed: "Employee wishes to be employed by employer, for service in the State of Ark-ansas. as laborer at the rate of 56 1 ,6, cents per hour, and to continue in said employment as long as is mutually . agreeable. Employer consents ta engage employee under the terms, -conditions and . stipulations hereinafter set out.' Section 1 of the preamble recites that the appellant is a • Louisiana corporation with its domicile, in that State, and that it maintains offices in certain cities situated therein, at one of which the appellee was engaged for services in the State of Arkansas. Section 2 recites that the corporation is subject in the State of Louisiana to the operation of ap act of the General Assembly of that State known as the Workmen's Compensation Act. . " Section 3 recites . that the corporation has seeured permissiOn to do business in Arkansas and voluntarily - extends to its employees therein all of -the rights and benefits of :the Louisiana law. - Section 4 recites that the corporation gives and has given injured employees in Arkansas necessary medical and hospital treatment and has paid the . employee's compensation in'accordance with tbe terms of the-Louis•- iana law regardless of the question of negligence, or the legal defenses the corporation might have had. • By § 5 the corporation says it has paid comPensation to injured employees when there was•no legal liability under the laws of the State-of Arkansas. Section 7 recognizes that, while ' extending the benT efits of the Louisiana law to its employees in Arkansas, the corporation is liable under . the laws of Arkansas . to employees injured by the negligence of the agents and employees of the corporation. .
- 498 -STANDARD-PIPE LINE CO. i)..7BURNETT. Section 8 states that when an employee is injured through negligence of the corporation, in many- instances such employee brought . suit in the courts of Arkansas for amounts in excess of the amounts allowed by the Louisiana law. Section 9 states that when the employees were injured through their own fault, they accepted compensation under the Louisiana act. Section •10 complains that the corporation pays its employees under the , Louisiana- act when injured through their own fault, yet when injured as a result of its' negligence the employees bring suit in Arkansas. Section 11 concludes that the corporation is paying all injured e.mployees . and is not deriving the • benefit .underrthe Louisiana act, and § 12 argues that this is unfair. - • 'Section 13 is as folloWs "That the employee herein named has been offered the qition of working for the Standard Oil Company of . Louisiana under the terms, conditions and stipulations of the Louisiana Workmen's Corapensation Act;'Which 'act • requires the- pAyment f certain fixed amounts regardless of legal liability for -negligence, and the payment of doctor's bills and hospital fees, up to a stipulated amount ; or of:working under the laws of the State of Arkansas, which 'do no:t require the payment of any damages -or the furnishing of medical or hospital services, exce p t in cases of negligence on the part of the employer, And said employee does how voluntarily elect to work for the said Standard Oil Company of Louisiana under the terms, conditions and stipulations of the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act, a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof." _ - Section 1.4 provides "that in the State of Arkansas no Workmen's Cornpensatiom Law is in effect, And the employer is not liable to the employee for injuries sustained by the employee while engaged in his employment, except on account of negligence on-Abe part of the employer, its agents or employees, and that the defenses of contributory negligence, assumed risk, with other de-
ARK.] STANDARD PIPE LINK CO..v. BURNETT. 499 lenses,- when applicable, may be pleaded by the employer -to. defeat the claim of the employee for such injuries." The contract then provides that, in consideration of the things 'mentioned in the sections-noted, and for the .mutual 'benefit accruing to the respective parties, it iS agreed "that, should the -employee, while in the service of the employer; , receive an injury or injuries, compensation therefor shall only : be Claimed by the employee, and recognized and paid by the employer, in the same amount and in -the same inaimer as _is now fixed -and- determined •by .the Workmen's COmpenSation Law of the State of Louisiana, Whieh law; it , is agreed, in its entirety, 'as it now 'exists, is a part of, and embracedin, this'contract." • The remainder of -the contract relates to contingencies which may arise in the event the agreement is not binding on the next of kin or the estate . of the ployee in the event of his death, and concludes with the request to his next of kin, or his personal representative in, the event of his death . , to make 'settlement with the employer on • the basis .of, the Workmen's •Compensa-doll Act. • • It is clear froM the sections of , the, preamble quoted and . the recitals of -the various sections that,: .§ 13 professes to offer the- 'employee an option, Which- he has voluntarily accepted, that is, a free choice of conditions _under which he 'works, there- is- in _reality no alternative, but that he shall work Under the provisions:of :the •Workmen's Compensation Act of LOuisiana. , _ It:does not give him the right ofehoice- between the . benefits.of the Workmen's Compensation .Act .of•Louisiana and the . laws, of Arkansas, and it -is manifest that, if the prospective employee hopes to- secure work, the contract must be signed. - This interpretation, we -think,-is justified:by a consideration of the contract in its entirety, and the' phrasingf -that part of the-preamble first quoted, "Employee wishes °to be` employed. * * *.EMployer consents to employ era- • ployee under the -terms •set out." As we view it, there : is- nothing . voluntary about it This view is strengthened bythe language of the opening paragraph of the contract, ,quoted . supra. . By .that agreement, -in the event of injury, the employee. is not:given the, right .to
500 - _ STANDARD, PIPE- LINE CO.' V-RURNETT. .1.18S elect • to receive compensation under the laws of Louisiana, or to -have his rights determined and his compensation fixed by the laws of Arkansas, but those rights must be determined, and . compensation fixed, •by the laws of Louisiana, without regard to what 'the employee may desire. 3. It is next contended that the contract in no way attempts to limit liability , for injury. To sustain this contention, appellant argues that the fixing of the amount of compensation in no way limitsliability for injury, and 'that to bring it within the-inhibition of our laws it must have been such as to have defeated all liability, whereas it fixes a reasonable amount to be paid, if an injury occurs. For these reasons; appellant contends that the doctrine announced in Pine Belt Lbr. Co. v. Riggs, 80 Okla. 28, 193 Pac. 991 ; Little Rock R. Co. v. Eubanks, 48 Ark. 460, 3 S. W. SOS ; and Rosener v. Hermann, 8 Fed.' Rep. 782, have no application. The WorkMen's Compensation • Act, which was made a part-of the contract, is an involved and voluminous piece of legislation. - Its provisions bearing . on the question for .our determination are to be , found in the 'sections which relate to the amount of compensation and the procedure to be taken in the event of dispute and failure to agree upon a claim for compensation between the employer and employee. By §. 8, the amount of compenSatiOn is fixed for an injury causing total disability to do 'work of any reasonable character at 65 per cent. of the wages, during the period of disability, not .beyond 300 weeks ; for injury producing permanent total disability, 65 per cent: of the wages previously earned,. to extend not beyond a period of 400 weekS, and, where there is partial disability, 65 per cent. of the difference between wages at the time of the injury and wages which the injured employee may bC able to earn thereafter, to extend not beyond 300 weeks. Provision is made for certain specific injuries, as for-loss of thumb,first 'finger, toe, band, arm, etc. We call attention, however, only to the disability allowed:•or •osof both hands, or both feet, or both eyes, or One liand 'and! one foot, which is 65 per cent. of the wages previously earned, for a period of 400 weeks: •
-ARK.] . STANDARD PIPE LINE CO. v. BURNETT. • • 501 • The argument that.it was riot the purpose-of the contract to limit the liability, but to limit the Tecovery,.and therefore was -not offensive to the provisions of the adt, is :well answered by the appellee thus : "What is liability in personal injury cases? -Is it not simply the obligation to respond in damages, and is not an attempt to exempt the master from his obligation tO so respond, 'an attempt to- exeMpt him from a portion of his liability?". The-•answer-to the question is obvious. When the remedy is lessened, the liability to That extent is de-•stroyed. . * Section 18 .provides for the procedure in the event of dispute and failure to agree upon the amount.Of -compensation, and- that the case be submitted-to a -single judge who shall hear . and determine all of the questions in dispute and render. his judgment without the interven-•tion ota jury. . . This contract-deprives a citizen of this State- of an appeal to its • courts and remits him for the establishment of his rights and a remedy for his wrongs to a foreign jurisdiction, -to be determined by..procedure 1.1.11- knoWn - here, and contrary to our • traditional policy. ArticlO 2, § 7, of our Constitution- preserves in all cases triable in a court of law the right to a trial by jury,• Without.regard to the:amount in controversy. No declaration *of a settled policy could be :clearer than the language there used, and any shift to thwart or nullify the fundamental -law cannot be upheld. -It is apparent, Whatever -the argument may be, -that the making of the contract was not the vOluntary act of the app • ellee. The .practical interpretation of the contract•is, no contract, no job. By the contract, an employee's remedy for injury suffered for a negligent act of the employer, while:not wholly taken away, is . seriously impaired; first, as has been ob-. served, by the necessity of his having to resort to a foreign forum, and,. second, hy limitation of the amount to be recovered in a ,sum in many eases . which might well-be supposed little- -Short of . .a . coMplete• denial of .redre-ss. Without regard 'to the milpability Of the emploYer, the age of - the enniloyee, the . nimber. Of his' dependents, or the_ reasonable expectation 'of greatly increasea earning
-502- -STAN-DA:RD- PIPE- LINE-GO: V-. BURNETT. power, or of the length of time he may be expected t6-live, yet, if totally and permanently disabled, his compensation is limited to 65 per cent. of the wages he waS earning at the very time of the injury, and can in no event continue beyond a . period of 400 weeks, or seven and one-seventh years. This is an arbitrary fixing of compensation, which, in many instances, would be so much less than the damages to which the employee is justly entitled as to amount to a denial of liability. Our Constitution, by §. 32, art. 5, has asserted as basic .law, and as further declaratory of our settled policy, that "no act of the General Assembly shall limit the amount to be -recovered for injuries resulting in death or injuries to persons or property"; and by § 6 of art. 12; power is reserved to alter or amend any general laws exis . ting at the time corporations are formed; by § 11, art. 12, foreign corporations are authorized to transact business in this State under such limitations and restrictions as may be prescribed by law. Those limitations and restrictions (§ 1828, Crawford & Moses' Digest) are such as. are imposed by law upon domestic corporations. -If,. then, the General _Assembly cOuld not limit the amount to. be recovered for personal injuries received, it follows that a creature which owes its existence to a legal birth and operates within the State by its permiSsion, under legal restrictions, may not do that which the law-making body itself cannot do. To leave no doubt regardinc , the policy of this State, the General Assembly, by act I\To. 175, supra, of which §§ 7144 and 7147 of -Crawford & Moses' Digest are a part, provided for liability for injury suffered by -an employee of any corporation except those engaged in interstate commerce: The exception was made because corporations of the last-named class, with respect . to liability for injuries to its employees, was fixed by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Section 4 of act No. 175 (now § 7147, Crawford & Moses' Digesp. provide§ that any contraCt, etc., seeking to- eempt . dorPorations from any liability imposed should bp : t o that extent void. The contract, then, being, aS we hOld, a shift to evade the laws of this State; and in conflict with public policy, the
court correctly sustained the demurrer to that part of appellant's answer which pleaded said contract as a de:- fense to plaintiff's suit. Little Rock, etc., Ry. v. Eubanks, and Leep v. Ry. Co., supra; Liverpool, etc, , v.• Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 9 S. Ct. 469; The Kensington, 263 U. S. 263, 22 S. Ct. 102. To sum up our conclusions : (a) Act No. 175 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1913, is not within any inhibition of thec ;National or State Constitutions ; (b) the contract pleaded in bar was not voluntarily entered into ; (c) it gives the employee no right of election in the event of injury, between the Workmen's Compensation Act of Louisiana and the rights accorded by the laws of this State in which the cause of action arose ; (d) it remits the employee to a foreign jurisdiction for the enforcement of his rights ; (e) and depriVes him of his constitutional right of trial by jury ;- (f) its practical effect is --to exempt the employer of a Part of his liability by limiting the amount of recovery, without, regard to any except an arbitrary ,measure of damages ; (g) it is not fair in.its terms Or fairly entered into ;•. (h) the contract contravenes 'the public policy of this State as expressed by the Constitution, and Js void -within the meaning of § 7147 of Crawford & Moses-' Digest. . • It- follows from: the views . - expressed that the judgMent• of the trial court is correct, and it is therefore affirmed.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.