ARK.] BEESON V. CHAMBERS, 'CHANCELLOR. 265 BEESON V. CHAMBERS, CHANCELLOR 4-4258 Opinion delivered February 17, 1936. 1. VEN UE— TRANSITORY ACTION.—A suit to foreclose a . chattel mortgage is a transitory action of which the chancery court of the county in which one of the mortgagors resided and was served with process had jurisdiction. 2. MORTGAGES—F ORECLOSURE—APPOINTMENT OF RECEWER.—The chancery court in which a suit to foreclose a chattel morigage was properly brought had jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to take charge of the mortgaged property as an incident to its jurisdiction. 3. RECEIVERSHIP— CONTEMPT—Where a chancery court appointed a receiver to take charge of mortgaged chattels, it has jurisdiction of a contempt proceeding, under process served in another county, against a third person who interferes with its jurisdiction by converting the mortgaged property. 4. E Q UITY— JURISDICTION.—A chancery court has inherent power to preserve its dignity and enforce its jurisdiction. 5. E Q UITY— ENFORCEMENT OF JURISDICTION.—A chancery court which has acquired jurisdiction of mortgaged chattels in a foreclosure suit has authority to direct process to any part of the State for service to preserve its jurisdiction. Prohibition to Logan Chancery Court, Southern District ; John E. Chambers, Chancellor ; writ denied. Petition by E. W. Beeson and others for a writ of prohibition against John E. Chambers, Chancellor. Charles W. Mehaffy, for petitioners. Evans & Evans, for respondent. SMITH, J. S. H. Kincannon & Sons executed a chattel mortgage to the Bank of Magazine to secure an indebtedness of $1,800 due the bank. The Kincannons are residents of Booneville, and the mortgage was recorded in Logan County, in which county the towns of Magazine and Booneville are both located. The debt secured by the mortgage was not paid, and suit was brought December 24, 1934, in the chancery court for the Southern District of Logan County, of which district of the county the mortgagors were still residents when the suit was filed. A. receiver was appointed who qualified as such and took possession of the mortgaged prOperty. On December 31, 1934, he filed with the. court .an
266 BEESON V. , CHAMBERS, CHANCELLOR: [192 inventory of the ,property of which he, had .taken possession. On June 19, 1935, the plaintiff bank filed an amendment to its 'complaint, with A petition for : a citation for contempt of court. This pleading alleged that E. W. Bee-son, acting . for , the ,Beeson, , Moore . Stave :ComPany, domestic corporation . of. which he Was „president, had taken into his possession and had converted to: his own use, and that of the stave 'company, the heading'covered by . the Mertgage *from 'the Kincannons, of which the receiver had takeri poSseSsion, under ordei 'of the cOurt. It was prayed that Beeson and the stave company be made ' parties defendant, and that a citationdssue against BeeSon reqUiring Mtn to • • show cause why he shoukt not be' cited : for Contempt in taking, removing• and : appropriating property' in the custody : of the court thrOugh its receiver. : Beeson is a te . sident, of Pulaski County, !And the stave company, has its office sand place .of -business in that county. ....... . . . -Stnimonses wOr0 issued again g : Beeson ..and zi the staVe Company on this amendment tO the complaint, and they were both served in Pulaski County. Separate mo-tións were •filed by 'Beeson 'and the stave coMpany to quash this service, which motions Were over'ruled'hy the chancery, court; whereupon a• petition ''waS : filed Iii this court to .prohibit the Logan Chancery- Court,froin.ipro,, ceeding further upon . this amended . coMplaint.. • .•'. The relief here prayed is asked upOn the 'ground that sthe schancery court of Logan :County has no jurisdiction of the .subject-matter i or over the persons ;of:the petitioners herein, upon the service of the process had upon ,them. In other words; having . been served . with process in Pulaski County, they cannot on that service be made parties to the pending* suit in Logan County for, the reason that there is no, joint liability between them . and the original defendants 'in the ,foreclosure suit. The argument is that the foreclosure suit is• one action and a suit for the conversion of: the mortgaged .property iS another and a' separate action;.and, there.being no . joint liability, the . respective -defendants . . must.be , separately sued and servide must be..had . upon., 'these Tetitioners
ARK.] BEESON V. CHAMBERS, CHANCELLOR. 267 Where the • one resides, and the oiher has ' its * * place. of business.. We do not concnr in this . view. The chancery court of Logan County 'had jurisdiCtion of the foreclosure suit. • Section 1176, Crawford & Moses' Digest. • 'As an, incident to this jurisdiction, it had the power to appoinfa receiver to take : charge of ithe :mortgaged property, and -this had been done : . Section 8612, Crawford & Moses' Digest. This is a' transitory action, and was brought in the county where all the mortgagors : reside and were "served with process: . . The chancery' Court was' exercising a jurisdiction which it clearly has. Beeson and his Corporation have interfered with this jurisdiction by converting the subject-matter thereof. By so doing they became subject to the : jurisdiction of : the' Logan Chancery Court under the service of process had:upon: them. The chancery court has the inherent power to preserve its dignity and 'to enforce its jthisdietiOn. It had jurisdiction to • foreclose the chattel . -mortgage ; -and the proper' and . requisite service had been • had: upoir the mortgagors to exercise *this . jurisdietion, and the court had taken the , Subjeet-matter of the litikation into its eaStOdy through itS receiver. This jurisdiction could not be defeated by the asportation and .conversion of .the subject-matter. of the litigation and. the wrongdoer . stepping over a-County line. 'The' court had power, , having proiDerly acquired jiiiiSdietion 'of' the' snbjeet-matter, to direct its'prOceSs to''anypart . Of,the State for seryice, 'for the purpose of preserving that 'jurisdiction. It ha.s been held in many cases, one of the latest being that of Moore v. Price, 189 Ark..117, 70 S.. W. (2d) '563, that : "When a chancery court acquires jurisdiction, it has the right to condnct the, matter' to' an , end, and , decide all matters involved in the chancery suit." In Clark, on the Law of RebeiVers, vol. 1, § 626 (2d ed.) it is said: "It would be a -Vain thing for a conrt to' appoirit a receiver 'and make 'orderS *affecting parties • and affecting 'the property' in - the 'custody of the court; unless the court had power to enforce suChorders. : • * * * NO -rule is better settled ' than that 'when a conrt has appointed a receiver, his possessiOn is • the pos ' Seision of
268 [192 the court for the benefit of the parties to the suit, and all concerned and can not be disturbed without leave of court, and that if any person without leave intentionally interferes with such possession, he necossarily commits a contempt of court, and is liable to punishment there-for. * ' There is no question but that the court will not permit a receiver appointed by its authority, and who is therefore its officer, to be interfered with or dispossessed of the property he. is directed to receive by any one." For the reasons herein stated, the prayer for prohibition to the Logan Chancery Court must be denied, and it is so ordered.
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