214 lfortE VS. WOODRUFF. [5 MAXIE 43. 'WOODRUFF. ,So much of the 4th section of chapter ST of the Revised Statutes as proviaes that justices of the peace shall have no jurisdiction of any slit against a corporation, is a palpable violation of the constitution. As justices of the peace have the constitutional jurisdiction to entertain suits against corporations, on demands of $100 or under, that jurisdiction can be exercised, though the legislature neglect to prescribe any pv.wess or method by which it can be exercised on snits commenced. The legislature cannot, by acts either of commission or omission, altee and destroy the separate constitutional jurisdiction of any of the constitutional tribunals. A justice's court can Make its own rules and regulations to carry into effect its original, constitutional jurisdiction ; and therefore, when suit is instituted before a justice against a bank, he may adopt a summons as his process, and upon service on the officers of the bank, proceed to render judgment. After judgment so obtained against a corporation, the creditor is entitled to issue writS of garnishment, as in "other cases. 1:nt if. on writ of garnishment issued, the interrogatories filed before the justice allege that the garnishee is indebted to the bank in a sum over $100, this defeats the action against the garnishee. The indebtedness of the garnishee, being over $100, is beyond the jurisdiction of a justice, and cannot be split up so as to give him jurisdiction. THIS was an appeal from a justice of the peace,*determined in the Pulaski Circuit Court, in December, 1842, before .the Hon. JOHN J. CLEM/EMS-, one of the circuit judges. More sued the Real Estate Bank in March, 1842, before a justice, on two of its notes, •for $50 each. The justice issued an ordinary summons, which was served by reading th-the president; and on the return day he rendered judgment by default. More then sued out from the justice a-writ of garnish-ment on the judgment, against Woodruff, and on its return filed interrogatories, alleging that Woodruff owed the Bank ten thousand dollars. Woodruff filed several pleas before the justice: First, that he had no jurisdiction of the suit against the Bank. Second, that there was no valid service of process op the Bank. . Thi/rd and Fourth, that no execution had, issued against the Bank, and been returned nulla bone, before the garnishment issued. Fifth, that the justice had no jurisdiction of the proceeding by garnishment. Judgment against Wood-ruff for the amount of judgment ag ainst the Bank, and costs, In the Circuit Court, demurrer to the pleas, and ioinder. Demurrer over - ruled, and appeal.
\ ARK.] MORE VS. WOODRUFF. 215 The ease was argued here by Trapnall & Cocke, for appellant, and Ashley & Watkins, contra. Ly the Co'art, LACY, J. The principal ques:ions in this case relate to the constitution jurisdiction of justices of the peace. The fourth section of the eighty-seventh chapter of the Revised Statutes declares that no justice shall have cognizance of any action against corporations. We hold this act to be a palpable violation of the constitution. That instrument declares that jus:ices of the peace, severally or jointly, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all matters of contract, (except in actions of covenant), where the sum in controversy .does not exceed one hundred dollars. This grant . of power is express and general, and applies to corporations as well as to other suitors. Its terms being general, cannot be limited; and as they are .Lnnerative, must be obeyed. Therefore, where any person has a demand against a corporation, upon a contract not exceeding one hundred dollars, he has an undoubted right to resort to the justice's court Ins remedy and redress; and the. same right attaches in favor of corporations in like cases. But it is said that, although the justice has an original special and constitutional jurisdiction in such cases, still, as the legislature has omitted to pass any law on the subject, they cannot exercise that jurisdiction. This we deny. It. is the constant practice of the Supreme Court. of the United States to make its own rules and orders for the exercise of its own original constitutional jurisdiction, and that, too, in a class of cases where Congress has failed to act. This the cases of Chilsorn's Ex'rs vs. The Sta,te of Georgia; Thuger vs. The State of South Carolina; The State of New York vs. The State of Connecticut, 4 Dall. 1; and The State of Rhode Island vs. The State of Massachusetts, 12 Peters, clearly prove. The Supreme Court of ihe United States being ordained by the constitution,, necessarily possesses all the judicial power incidental to the e'xercise of its original jurisdiction. The justice's court, under our form of government, is a constitutional tribunal, and clothed with exclusive original jurisdiction for certain purposes. It is a universal rule of construction, that the grant of a principal power, ipso facto, includes all minor, subsidiary powers incidental to the exercise of the main power. The Legisla-
216 MORE v.. WOODRUFF. L5 .ture possesses DO power, either by acts of commission or omission, to alter or destroy the separate and independent constitutional jurisdiction of our respective courts. The constitution, in ordaining this de-- partment of the government, and in defining and specifying their peculiar powers and duties, contemplated that the Legislature would pass the necessary laws for their complete organization. Their failure to do so certainly does not render inoperative or Void the inherent and indispensable attributes that all these courts possess as matters of constitutional ri g ht and legal duty. For if this be true, then the Legislature, by omitting to act, as well as by acting, in an unwarrantable manner, can defeat the main objects and design of the constitution, • which is, to establish and administer an impartial system of public justice, for the maintenance and protection of personal rights and private property: If these principles be undeniable, the justice's court was fully campetent to make its own rules and regulations to carry into effect its original constitutional jurisdiction; and in the eNercise of this discretion,in the present instance,that tribunal has not oversepped the pale of its authority. The corporation was then properly before the justice's court, and he committed no error in entering up jud2iment against the Bank. After. obtaining jud , c _ ■ . ment, the plahltiff's right against the debtors of the corporation were entitled to the same protection by virtue of the statute of garnishment, as in other cases. But to enforce these rights, be is compelled to resort to the proper tribunal. And as the justice's court possesses only a special original constitutional jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that, jurisdiction mnst be made to appear upon the record; for, unless it does so appeal . , DO valid judgment can be pronounced, and advantage may be taken of this -defect at any sthge in the proceeding; and so it has been held repeatedly by this court. In the present instance, tbe writ of garnishment, and the suggestions and interrogatories filed in support of it, charge the defendant in error as being indebted to the Bank in a sum of mono of ten thousand dollars. This statement defeats the plaintiff's cans2 of action against the garnishee. It shows that the justice could not cin-stitutionally take cognizance of the action—the amount in controversy being above one hundred dollars, to which his special jurisdiction is limited. The indebtedness, as alleged, is an entirety or single con-
ARK.] 217 tract incapable of being divided into fractional parts, to give original jurisdiction to the justice's court. To allow such a proceeding would be to subject the defendant to an endless multiplicity of suits, which yould be as intolerable as unwarrantable. The view we have taken of this subject necessarily determines all the garnishee's special pleas to the jurisdiction of the justice's court to be untenable. The demurrer to them was, therefore, properly-overruled by the Circuit Court; but as that court erred in not dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction, and in giving judgment for costs, its judgment is reversed.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.