BLACKBURN, Ex Parte. 21 BLACKBURN, Ex Porte. The county courts have, both by the constitution and the statu tes. unquestionable jurisdiction in regard to the removal of county seats. Consequently. a writ of pr( ldbition will not lie to a county court, to forbid its removal of the seat of just ice, even on an allegation that they are proceeding to remove it under an unconstitutional law. IS was an application, upon the part. of the petitioner, to this Court for a Writ of prohibition, to be directed to • ile county court of county, preventing them from removing the seat of justice, and records of that court; from Boonville to Wynfield. The facts set ,-• :t in favor of the writ sl:owed, that the petitioner was the legal own?r d proprietor of certain lots in the town of Boonville, on which were .cied valuable improvements, and that the town was originally lo-ed and laid out upon ten acres of land, donated by Gilbert Mar-slmll and David Titsworth to the commissioners of said county, for flie purpose of establishing a seat of justice thereon, and that they e:.:ecuted their bond for title, and that Marshall purchased a lot of the commissioners, which bond was afterwards taken up by the petit:oner, fr. 1. , assignee of Marshall, by executing a deed in fee, in lieu thereof, and that he also became the purchaser of the lot originally owned by Marshall. The legislature had recently passed an act ordering the removal of the seat of justiee from Boonville to Wynfield, and directing the records of the county and circuit courts to be trinSferred to the latter place, and the seat of justice to be yermanently fixed there, until otherwise chan[ r ed by law. It was contended, in behalf of the petitioner, that this act was unconstitutional. because it deprived him
22 BLACKBURN, Ex Parte. [5 of vested rights, without making any adequate compensation for the loss he would sustain. By the Court, LACY, J. Whether the petitioner's rights are vested or not, so that the legislature cannot remove the seat of justice without paying him for his lots and improvements, and complying with the contract made with the.county court, is a question we are not now called on to decide, because the point is not properly before us. It is clear; both upon authority and reason, that he is not entitled, by the remedy sought, to a writ of prohibition. The county court, both by the constitution and statutes, have unquestionable jurisdiction over the subject matter, for the removal of the seat of justice; and this bi g the ease, a writ of prohibition will not lie. It was expressly stated by this Court, in the case of Williams, ex parte, where the whole doctrine upon writs of prohibition was elaborately examined, and the principles.. and manner of proceeding under it accurately laid down and defined, that "the writ lay where an inferior coUrt was proceeding without jurisdiction, or where the jurisdiction belonged to another court, or where the inferior court transcended 'its jurisdiction by holding plea for too large an amount, or where the plaintiff had one- demand, and split it into several actions, to give an inferior court jurisdiction, or where the judges proceeded in cases where they were prohibited to do so by an act of Parliament." These principles being established, it is equally clear, upon authority and reason, that the writ will never lie to a court having cognizance of the cause, or jurisdiction of the subject matter, on a suggestion of erroneous proceeding. The rule at common law is, that no prohibition lay to an inferior court, for matters arising- out of their jurisdiction, until that matter had been pleaded, and the plea refused. In the present case, the count y court unquestionably possesses 'jurisdiction over the subject matter, and therefore the writ will not lie, and this application must be denied.
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