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JULY TERM, 1856. 266*] *CORNISH 1st. The refusal of the court below V. lc allow him to file his two pleas at the time proposed. SARGENT. 2d. And the rendering of judgment The defendant has until the calling of a cause in its regular order on the docket to tile pleas to the by default against him. merits, and the court cannot abridge the time by The question presented by the as-a rule of practice. (7 Ark. 117 ; 10 Id. 443 12, Id. signment in this case, has been so re 718.) eatedly adjudicated by this court, that Appeal from Union Circuit Court. we shall content ourselves with disposing of the cause before us, by simply HE HON. ABNER A. STITH, Cir-T citing those adjudications. See Norris cuit Judge. v. Kellogg & Co., 7 Ark. 117. Hixon v. Carleton, for the appellant. Weaver, 9 Ark. 137. North v. Davis, Lyon, for the appellee. same 138. State v. Jennings, 10 Ark. 443. State Bank v. Minnikin, 12 Ark. HANLY, J. This was debt, brought 718. by the defendant in error, against the We hold, therefore, that the court plaintiff, in the Union circuit court, to below erred in refusing to permit the the fall term. 1855. plaintiff in error to file his two pleas in It appears from the bill of exceptions bar, under the circumstances shown in taken in the court below, that there this case, as stated. was a rule of the court requiring the The judgment is reversed and the pleading in all cases pending therein cause remanded with directions to the to be made up by the fourth day of the court below to permit the plaintiff in term. error to file his two pleas in bar, at any It further appears that on the morn-time before the cause is reached in its ing of the fourth day of the return order on the docket, and peremptorily term of the writ in this cause, during called by the court. the rule hours, and whilst the court Absent, Hon. C. C. Scott. was proceeding with the roll of attor-Cited:-23-649; 21-624. neys, and hearing and disposing of motions made by them, and before this cause was regularly reached upon the docket, the attorney for Sargent, the plaintiff below, moved the court for judgment by default against the _defendant Cornish, for want of a plea ; upon which the counsel for Cornish proposed and offered to file then two pleas in bar, to-wit, the general issue, and set-off, and asked the court to be permitted to file said pleas, which the court refused to permit him to do, in consequence of the rule 67*] *of practice above stated, and thereupon gave judgment by default against Cornish for the amount of the note declared on, with damages and costs. Cornish excepted, and brought error. He assigns for error ;
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