558 LACOTTS v. LACOTTS. [118 LACOTTS v. LACOTTS. Opinion delivered May 24, 1915. APPEAL AND ERROR— REVERSAL WITH DIRECTIONS—CONCLUSIVENESS.—The reversal by the Supreme Court of a decree in chancery with directions to the chancery court to enter a certain decree, is conclusive of all the issues that were presented in the case or that could have been presented. Appeal from Arkansas Chancery Court; John M. Elliott, Chancellor; affirmed. Samuel Frauenthal, W. N. Carpenter and J. M. Brice, for appellant. 1. The appellant is not estopped. The question of the validity and legality of the decree upon which tbe appellee, George LaCotts' title is based, was not passed upon or acted on :by this court, on the former appeal. The question is not res adjudicata. 50 Ark. 190; lb. 338 ; 97 Id. 611 ; 21 Id. 364; 105 Id. 5. Whatever pleadings or matters were set up in the former case, they were simply a collateral attack upon the decree and the issue here has never been decided. 97 Ark. 450; 96 Id. 540; 75 Id. 1 ; 91 Id. 394. 2. The question is not res adjudicata. 2 Am. & E. Ann. Cas. 650 ; 3 Id. 86; 8 Id. 773 ; 122 Ala. 611 ; 20 So. 660 ; 90 Kans. 196; 135 Wisc. 38; 75 Ark. 150 ; 89 Ark. 509. 3. The decree in LaCOtts v. Gibson, is fatal, defective and void on appeal, or direct attack. 97 Ark. 151; 72 Id. 185; Kirby's Dig., § 4424. Botts & 0 U)aniel, for appellee. 1. The questions raised were settled on the former appeal. The matters are res adjudicata. 109 Ark. 335, 341; 105 Id. 493 ; 76 Id. 423 ; 94 Id. 351-2 ; 82 Id. 1 ; 94 Id. 332 ;, 184, 188; 43 Ark. L. R. 424; 44 Id. 165; 106 Id. 295; 74 Id. 322; 91 Id. 394. 2. -The chancery court was correct in rendering judgment in 'accordance with the mandate of this court. 109 Ark. 335; lb. 525, 52; 106 Id. 292; 81 Id. 440.
ARK.] LACOTTS v. LACOTTS. 559 • McCuLLocn, C. J. This is the second appeal in this case. The former opinion is published in volume 109 of the reports, page 335, where the facts are fully set out. It is a controversy concerning the title to a quarter section of land situated in Arkansas County. The judgment of this court was that the decree of the chancery court be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter a decree in favor of the appellant, George La-Cotts, who is the appellee in the present appeal. When the mandate of. this court reached the chancery court, the present appellant, John A. LaCotts, who was the defendant and cross-complainant below, filed a supplemental answer and cross-complaint attacking a decree in another cause which forms the basis of this title of ' appellee, George LaCotts, the land having been sold to the latter pursuant to the terms of that decree, which was against John A. LaCotts. The • chancellor decided that the issues presented in the amended . answer and cross-complaint had been adjudicated by this court and sustained a demurrer to the same -and entered a decree in favor of appellee, George LaCottS, in accordance with the mandate of this eourt. We are of the opinion that the chancery court was correct land that the former judgment of this court was in fact conclusive of the questions sought to be presented in the amended answer and 'cross-complaint. The actioh was instituted by George LaCotts, the present appellant, against John A. LaCotts, the present appellee, in which the 'plaintiff asserted title to the land 'under the decree mentioned and sought to have his tit•e quieted and the defendant in that action enjoined from interfering therewith. Defendant 'answered, attacking the validity ,of the decree under which the sale was made and also 'alleging that the plaintiff had purchased the land and took the title thereto under the sale as trustee for the defendant and that the plaintiff should he held to be a trustee ex inaleficio. The chancery court decided the ease in favor of the defendant, but on appeal to this court the decree was reversed and, as before stated, the 'cause was remanded with direction
560 LACOTTS v. LACOTTS. [118 to enter a decree in favor of the plaintiff. Even if the question of the validity of the decree, which formed the basis of appellee 's title, had not been expressly attacked in the pleadings, it was necessarily raised for the reason' that appellee's title was in issue and that called for any attack upon the decree which involved the question of the validity and strength of appellee's title. The principles announced •by this court in several cases are absolutely decisive of the present case in ap-pellee's favor. Chicago Mill & _Lumber Co. v. Osceola Land Co., 94 Ark. 183; Gaither v. Campbell, 94 Ark. 329; Baker v. Hudson, 117 Ark. 560. According to the decisions in those cases, a reversal of a decree in chancery, with directions to the chancery court to enter a certain decree, is conclusive of all the issues that were presented in the ,case or that could have been presented. However, as a matter of fact, the record of original pleadings in the case shows that the question' s raised in the amended answer and crosscomplaint were also 'raised in the original answer and cross-complaint. It appears that appellant abandoned the attack on the decree by failing to take any proof to sustain the cross-complaint, but that did not eliminate it as an issue in the case, and a decree of the chancery court or of this court on 'appeal, necessarily resulted in an 'adjudication of that question. Appellant also treats his plea as a bill of review in the former proceedings in which the decree was rendered under which the land was sold, and has brought up the record in that case and had it consolidated with this. It necessarily follows that the last decree of the chancellor, holding that the judgment of this court ibars any further inquiry into the title, eliminates the first decree from the case, land an affirmance of the Chancellor's last decree is conclusive of the whole matter. The decree is, therefore, affirmed.
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