ARR.] SPANN V. LANGSTON-WILLIAMS LUMBER' CO. ' 99 • SPANN V. LANGSTON-WILLIAMS LUMBER.:00MPANY. Opinion delivered , July 6,.1931. HUSBAND AND WIFE-LIABILITY OF WIFE ON COVENANTS.-A .marxied woman joining as grantor with her husband in a, deed conveying his land situated in Tennessee is liable• on the covenants of warranty contained therein, the disabilities of married women in that State having been removed. Appeal from Mississippi Chancery . COurt, Osceola District; J. M. Futrell, Chancellor ; affirmed. • . Hughes & Davis and-Randolph, Randolph & Clifton, for appellant. James G. Coston And J. T. Coston, for appellee. HUMPHREYS; -J. Appellee .brought this 'suit against 'appellant to recover . $2,500 for a breach of warranty in a'deed to standing timber on certain lands in Lauderdale County,. Tennessee, eXechted -by appellant , and her hhs-'hand, J. C. Spann, to appellee on December 7, 1925.- • • APpellant filed au ansWer denying- the breach or anY liability on the warranty and . a • eross • -complaint• to; re-•orim the timber deed • so as to show that she . jOined 'in the deed for the sOle purpose of conveying her marital rights therein. • The cause was submitted to the court hpon the plead-ings and testimony, which resulted in a * diSmissal of appellant's cross • -complaint and a judgment against her for $2;600 upon her breach of warranty, froin • which is' this appeal. The facts in' the case material to a deterMination' of the issue involved on the appeal are undisputed and are itsfollows: J. C. Spann bought the lands upon which the : timber was standing from Rice and Kirkpatrick on' August 11, 1920, and executed a mortgage thereon to secure a large part of the purchase money. On the 7th day of Decein-her,' 1925, J. C. Spann and appellant executed a deed to appellee for the timber thereon in consideration of $9,500, 'which deed contained the following clauses :
100 - SPANN :V. LANGSTON-WILIJAMS LUMW1 CO. .[1$4 "This indenture, made this 7th day of -December, A. D. 1925, by and between J. C. Spann and Mary E. Spann, his wife, parties of the first part, and unto and with Langston and Williams Lumber Compann Inc., parties of the second part." * * * "And the, said parties , of the firSt part do hereby covenant with the second parties,. and their lawful heirs, successors and assigns, that they .will forever warrant and defend the title of said timber and right-of-way, against all lawful claims whatsoever." The deed was signed by J. C. Spann and Mary E. Spann and the acknowledgment is as follows : 4 ACKNOWLEDGMENT. " State of Arkansas, County of Mississippi, ss. "Be it remembered, that on this, the 29th day of 11)6c:ember,. 1925, before me, Nora Wise, a duly commissioned and , acting notary public in and for said county and State, personally appeared J. C. Spann, grantor in the foregoing indenture, and known to me tO be the person whose name appears signed to the same, and acknowledged that he had signed the same for the consideration and purposes therein mentioned and set forth and desired me to so certify, which is accordingly done.. . "And I further certify that on this day voluntarily appeared before me Mary , E. Spann, wife of the said J. C. Spann, to me well known as , the person whose name appears on the foregoing instrument, and in the absence of her said husband declared that she had of her own free will signed the relinquishment of dower and homestead therein contained for the purposes herein contained and set forth, without compulsion or undue influence of her said husband. "In witness wherRof, I have set my hand and seal the day and date first written above. (Seal) "Nora Wise, Notary i'ublic." When the deed was presented to appellee by J. C. Spann, it refused to accepl same and close the deal until Mary E. Spann had signed it. At the time she signed
ARK.] SPANN 1). LANGSTON-WILLIAMS LUMBER CO. 101 and acknowledged .the deed she told the notary• public that she was doing so to convey her marital rights in the land, and without any intention of binding herself persOnally on the warranty contained therein. This state, ment to the notary public was . not communicated to _ap-pellee. After she executed the deed, appellee accepted it and closed the deal without demanding an abstract to the lands in reliance on the covenants and warranties cOntained in same. The mortgage held by Rice and Kirk-patrick on the lands for the purchase price was foreclosed and the land sold on January 25, 1927. The mortgagees purchased the land at the foreclosure sale and thereafter brought suit to enjoin appellee from cutting and removing the timber. About two years after the injunction suit had been pending, appellee compromised the claim and . suit for $2,500 and by doing so prevented a $7,00Q loss. It then brought this suit against appellant on her warranty, her husband having in the meantime, died. The testimony failed to show a mutual mistake in the execution of the timber deed, so the trial court did not commit an error in refusing to reform the deed and in dismissing appellant's cross-complaint. The only question remaining to be determined on the appeal is whether a married woman who joins in the execution of a deed with her husband to lands belonging to him is liable upon the covenants and warranties contained therein. Prior to the emancipation act, Crawford & Moses' Digest, § 5577, liberating married women from marital unity in respect to contracts, a married woman was not bound by the covenants in a deed executed by her and her husband to lands. Renton Comity v. Ruther-ford, 33 Ark. 640. Since the adoption of the emancipation act, a married woman may exercise all the rights of a feme sole and is liable -upon her covenants' and warranties just as much so as her husband Or any third party would he. As we undefstand, the disabilities of married women with respect to their contracts h. ave been
102 [184 as: Completely removed by act in Tennessee as in Arkan-sas. In Tennessee a married woman ds bound upon the covenants in a warranty deed to . lands belonging to her husband in which she joins as a grantor unless she is entitled to a 'reformation thereof showing that she joined therein for the sole purpose of conveying her marital rights. Watts v. Ramsey, 156 Tenn. 463, 2 S. W. (2d) 411. In; the instant case, appellant was not entitled to a reformation of the deed under the preof. Therefore, she is bound by the covenants of the timber deed. No error appearing, the decree is affirmed.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.