224 SHRIGLEY v. PIERSON. [191 • SHRIGLEY v. PIERSON. • 473924 • Opinion delivered July .1, 1935. , . 1. APPEAL AND ERROR—PRESUMPTION IN• SUPPORT OF vEinIcr.—Where it is contended on appeal that the verdict is unsupported by evidence, the court .views the evidence, in the light most favorable to the appellee,.giving effect to ail reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. 2: AUTOMOBILES NEGLIGENCE OF OWNER-J-EVIDENCE. IR an action to recoVer from . an owner . of an automobile' for injUries sustained by one driving, the car at the c•Nvner's request, on the ground that ,the steering gear was defective, and, was . known to,the owner to be in defective condition, evidence held to support a , verdict, for plaintiff. . Appeal from Johnson Circnit Court ;. A. B. Priddy, Judge.;: affirmed. * .Reynolds & Maze, for- appellant. • , Patters* Sr., G. 0. Patterson, Jr:, and A. W. Bobins,-for appellee. :• . • • • ROMER, J. On . November 17, 1932, Mrs. Arch Pier-son, at •the invitation and request 'of the appellant, 'Guy Shrigley, undertook to ride in and •drive a Dodge sedan owned by him , from Clarksville, Arkansas, to the:city of Fayetteville, Arkansas, to. take..a.ppellant!s mother and father there for a visit with other members of the family. Mrs. Pierson made the journey to Fayetteville in safety, but while returning the car overturned, and she Was severely. injured. She brought suit against Shrigley to recover 'damages for this injury resulting in a verdict and judgment in her favor which, on appeal to this court, was reversed and remanded because'of error in.-the declarations of law given to the jury. •Shrigley v. Pierson,
ARK.] SHRIGLEY. V. PIERSON. 225 189 Ark. 386; 72 -S. W. (2d) 541. On the trial anew there was- again a verdict and judgment for- Mrs. • Pierson. On appeal it is conceded that the case waS submitted to the jury on proper instructions, but it is insisted that the ver-diet is unsupported by the evidence adduced, and that this is true in three particalars : first, because of • failure to show that there was, -in fact, any defect in the car ; second, that, if there was a defect, there was no evidence to show that appellant knew : of it; and, third, that, if, indeed, a. defect existed of which appellant had knowledge, there was , ,no proof that this was the proximate cause of the overturning of the . car and the resalting injury to the appellee. We consider the first two propositions and review the evidence bearing upon. these questions, having in mind the settled rnle that they must be viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee, giving effect -to all the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence in support of the verdict. The evidence on behalf of the appellee may be thus stated: the Dodge sedan was purchased by appellant in 1931, and on January 18, 1932, some repairs were made to the steering gear. In July, 1932, the car was taken to an automobile repair shop Where it was examined by the shop foreman who was an automobile mechanic. He found that the steering device was badly worn and needed to be replaced by new parts. In its condition, when examined, it was the opinion of the mechanic that it was dangerous to • operate. He informed appellant of its condition, and was given to understand that new parts would be Supplied. The conclusion to be drawn from all the testimony is that no repairs were made to the • steering device until after the accident in November, 1932. There. is no positive testimony to the effect that appellant was informed by the mechanic who examined the car in July that the car was dangerous to operate because of a defective steering gear. But the defects • were. described to hirn, and it is reasonably certain from appellant's own testimony that he was experienced in the •operation of automobile, and from this experience was able- to judge as to
226 SHRIGLEY v.YIKEISON. [191 the possible dangers incident to the operation . of a car, if its steering apparatus was worn and defective.. With respea • to the defects, and as to appellant's knowledge thereof, there is .also testimony to show that in conversation with the appellee within a short time after her injury, .appellant asked ber if, she knew how tbe accident occurred,- and when she told him that she was unable to properly guide the car, he answered: "I was afraid, of that . steering . device.". After the accident the car was repaired, and the mechanic who did .the work found the steering gear so.badly worn that it was neeessary.to .re, place .it, which he . did. It uppears..therefore that there is substantial evidence both as to the defect in the steering. gear and as to appellant's knowledge thereof.. On the , third -contention, there is. evidence that the condition of the steering gear,- as found by the mechanic, was such as might cause an accident similar to the one from which appellee has: suffered. There is evidence that one of the tires was punctured by. a Jarge nail,.causing -a. "blowout". .-Appellee was an experienced and skillful driver, .and there : is evidence that, if the -steering gear had been in proper -condition, she could have controlled the movement of the, car, notwithstanding the disturbance to its normal movement caused . by the blowout. It is in evidence, .however, that; As the car swerved because of the blowout, or for some other reason, . when appellee undertook to guide it, she, Avas unable, to move the.steering wbeel, and, as she described it, the steering gear "locked." Appellant calls our attention to the recent case of Lewis v. Jackson, ante p. 102, which is xelied on to support the contention that the defect alleged and proved was not the proximate cause of the overturning of the automobile. In the case cited the negligence alleged was permitting a truck to be operated with defective brakes. It was overturned while being operated along.the highway. There was no proof tending to show that the defective brakes caused or contributed to the occurrence or what, in fact, was the cause. In the instant case the evidence, -viewed most favorably for the appel-
AB 297 lee, is to the effect that the steering device, because of its worn condition, might slip or move from its proper position depending on road and general 'driving- conditions, and thus cause it -"to become tight and hard to control." From the: testimony of the appellee,- this seems to . be jnst what happened, Without which she could have regained control of the automobile and prevented its overturning. This evidence was aCcepted by the jury as true,, and is sufficient to establish as the proximate cause of the, injury the defects complained of. It follows that the judgment of the, trial court was correct, and is therefore affirmed.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.