NOVEMBER TERM, 1886: 157 Zerger et al. v. Quilling. ZERGER ET AL. V. QUILLING. FEES : Sheriff's for Liquor Licenses. The provision in section 4, Of the act of March 8, 18* Mang the collector's fee at 1 per cent, of the amount paid for liquor licenses, was not repealed by section W, of the revenue act of 1883. APPEAL from Desha Circuit Court. Hon. Jonx A. WILLIAMS, Judge. C. II. Harding and T. B. Martin, for appellants. The collector is only entitled to one per eent. on licenses to sell liquors, and not five per cent. His compensation is fixed (sec. 4, act of March 8, 1879) at one per cent., and not by sec. 5797, Mansfield's Digest, which is taken from scc. 156, act of March 31, 1883. By reference to sec. 156 it will be seen that five per cent. can only be charged on such licenses as are delivered to. the coHector in blank, and such as he must deliver to the applicant as a matter of right, upon his complying with
1 , 58 SUPREME COVRT OF ARTANSAS, Zerger et al.. v. Quilling. the law, and payment of the tax. To . obtain a liquor lieense the, . party ,. inust apply to the . county court, and it grants or refuses the license. The , licenses ,, upon which the -collector may legally charge five per cent., e?spire at different dates from liquor licenses, (Acts 1 . 883,.scc.156,cp.,277; Mansf. Dig., sec. 4508,) And the collector. i . required to report . and settle quarterly for 'such licens . e . s , as he is allowed to charge five per . cent. on; not so with . liqUor . licenses. Acts 1883, sec. 15.7. Jame Murphy, for appellee.. The act of March 31, 1883, repealed in toto all of sec. 4, of the act of March 8, 1879, including the clause fixing the collector's fee at one per cent., and under the act of 1883, the collector is allowed five per cent. Sec. 156. The revenue act of 1883 was intended to cover the entire subject of revenue; it changed the amount of license tax, and in fact -repealed it, and fixed the fee at five per cent. Section 226, in express terms, repeals all laws inconsistent with it. CocKniLL, C. J. This is an action under the statute against a collector for demanding and collecting an illegal fee. (Bagley v. Shoppach, 43 Ark., 375.) The question is whether so much of section 4, of the act of March 8, 1879, as fixes the collector's fee at one per cent. of the amount paid for a liquor license, was repealed by section 156 of the - revenue act of 1883. The provision of the first act was carried forward into Mansfield's Digest, as section 4510 ;- the other provision that is supposed to be inconsistent with it, appears as section 5797. Section 4510 has been amended and re enacted, allowing the collector a commission of two per cent. upon the amount paid, (see Acts
NOVEMBER TERM, 1886. 159 Zergef et al. v. Quilling. 1885, p. 88), thus fixing the law with certainty for all cases arising since its passage. It is conceded that this controversy arose under, and that the rights of the parties. were fixed by, the - law as it stood prior to the amendment. There can be but one construction of the meaning of the act of 1879, with reference to the collector's commissions. He was to receive one pei cent, of the amount of the liquor license. No other license is referred to in the act. The liquor license is not mentioned in terms in section 156 of the act of 1883. It refers generally to . licenses which the clerk signs in blank and delivers, to the• collector, to be by him grante.d as a matter of right, to any applicant who pays the license tax and fees. But a liquor license, is not in that class. The county court grants or refuses that license, and it does not go as_ a . matter of course. Levy, ex parte,.43 Ark., 42. "Now," as was said in Blackwell v. State, 45 Ark., 90 "the revenue act of 1883 'does not expresSly repeal Any provision of the license law of 1879"—the same acts now under consideration. ` . `Nor do the two . acts cover the same field of legislation ; one being directed to the general subject of raising revenues, and the other to the particular subject of regulating the sale . of intoxicating liquors. So that if there is any repeal in this case, it must be on account of an -irreconcilable conflict between. their several provisions." (See, too, Drew . County v. Bennett, 43 Ark., 364.) But there_ is no such plain repugnance between the two provisions; that one must yield and give place to . the other. Both may stand by construing the two to refer to different classes of licenses, as indicated above, and this, we think, was the intention of „the legislature. The judgment of the Desha circuit court must therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded for a nw trial.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.