46 Ark.] ;CTOVEMBER TERM, 1885. 489 Chapman v.. Iludson. CHAPMAN V. HUDSON. 1. STATUTE OF LIMITAnOlcs : Traver. Conversion by bailee. :412 , action in the nature of trover cannot be maintained against a bailee for hire or his assignee, until the term of hire expires, and the statute of limitations does not -run against the owner of the property until then, unless the bailee or assignee does some act with the property inconsistent with his right as bailee, and amounting to an abandonment of it. This would be a conversion for which the action might be brought immediately, and from which time the running of the statute will date. [In this case the defendant purchased the property from the bailee, and used it as his own befoie the term expired; but the action was not brought for more than three years after the purchase, but less than three after the term. Held: Barred.—RP.] 2. Senj: Same. Removal of property. The removal or concealment of propeAy to avoid its recovery by an action of replevin, will not postpone the commencement of the statute of limitations against an action oi o.vqt . for conversion_ of the property. ATTEAL frona Little River Circuit Court. - HOD. J. E. BORDEN, Special Judge. W. P. Feazel, for appellant. Bales was a bailee for hire, and his bailor could bring no action against him . , either of trover or replevin, nor against his vendee, until the expiration of his lease. The action was not barred. Angell on Lim., p. 128, note 3 (6th
490 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS, [46 Ark. Chapman v. Hudson. ed.); 10 Ark., 228; 17 ib., 449; Bliss on Code Pl., sec. 23; Story on Bail, sec. 39; Cooley on Torts, p. 449; 50 Ala., 19; Wells on Replevin, secs. 31 to 53. If one by his unlawful act prevents . another from bringing a suit, the statute will not run until the disability is removel. Gantt's Dig., sec. 4143; 24 Ark., 559. A. J. Hudson, pro se. When there is a tortious, or wrongful taking, the statute of limitations begins to run from the taking or conversion. Angell on Limitations, 5th ed., sec. 304, and notes. If Bales sold the wagon and oxen, the sale was a conversion on his part, as well as on the part of defendant, Hudson, for which plaintiff might immediately- have brought his action against Bales or Hudson, or both of them, and the statute of limitations would begin to run from date of sale. 2 Hillard on Torts, 4th ed., sec. 4, pp. 32, 33. It is immaterial whether Bales sold the wagon ard team, or that the defendant took them without Bales' consent. Either act would amount to a conversion on defendant Hudson's part, and the statute would begin to run from the conversion in his favor. 2 Hilliard on Torts, 4th ed., secs. 123 and 3 a, pages 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and notes. The statute begins to rim whenever the cause of action is complete. 10 Ark., 228; 32 ib., 122. GOCKRILL, C. J. Chapman sued Hudson, in the little River circuit court, to recover the value of a wagon and oxen 1. Statute of Limi- Which the complaint alleged belonged to the tations: When plaintiff and had been converted by Hudson to commences in tro- Ter. his own use. The conversion took place in the summer of 1879; the suit was brought in December, 1882,
46 Ark.] NOVEMBER TERM, 1885. 491 Chapman v. Hudson. more than three years thereafter. The defense was the statute of limitations. The appellant sought to avoid the operation of the statute by proving that he hired, the oxen and wagon to one Bales for the residue of that year, and that Hudson obtained his possession from Bales. It is argued from this tliat the appellant could have maintained no action for the property until the beginning of the year 1880,, that is, _until the expiration of Bales' term of hiring. Now, as Bales was a bailee for hire and had the right of possession and an assignable interest in the property, this argument -would be unanswerable if he or his vendee had done 13) act amounting to a conversion; for while the right of pcs-session. is in another, the owner cannot maintain an action in the nature of trover. But Bales, notwithstanding he had only the temporary use of the property, ' took it to the state of Texas, and, being followed there lay the appellee and threatened by him with the levy of an attachment upon his effects, turned over the appellant's property to the appellee in pAyment of the debt for which the attachment issued; that is, he exercised the right of absolute ownership over it. This conduct was inconsistent with his right as bailee and was an abandonment of it. It was a conversion of the property, and is likened, by the authorities, to a destruction of it, and put an end to the contract of bailment, and the owner's right to take possession of the property or to recovet ; damages for the tort accrued immediately upon the commission of the act. Brown v. Wallace, 17 Ark., 451-2; Spencer 'v. McDonald, 22 476; Baily v. Colby, 34 N. H., 29; Sargearni v. Gill, 9 ib., 325; Sanborn v. Cohuren, 6 ib., 14; Farrant v. Thomp-son, 5 B. & Ald., 826; Galvin v. Bacon, 8 Me., 28; Bigelow Lead Cas. Tort, p. p. 429-30; Note to DeVoin, v. Mich. Lumber Co., 25 Am. Law Reg., 240-1.
492 SUPREd\TE COURT OF ART.,ANSAS, [46 Ark. Chapman V. 11134son, It is true Bales testified that he notified the appellee that he surrendered nothing more than his own interest in the property, but that tended to prove only that he corn-initted no wrongful act in making the sale, and, if true, it would have been a defense to an action against him for conversion. But his testimony and all the proof in the case lead to but one conclusion as to the intention of his vendee, the appellee here. He avowed his design to bald the property absolutely at the time of the negotiation, and exercised absolute dominion over it when it came to his possession. His version of the matter was that he he-lieved Bales had purchased the property from the appellant on a credit and had the right to sell it. The appellant was not ignorant of the adverse claim of title. A few -weeks after the appellee's purchase, he employed an attorney to bring suit for the recovery of the specific articles, and the attorney went to Texas, without delay, for that purpose, but the appellee prevented the suit, at that time, it is said, -by an unexpected removal of the property. 1•To further attempt appears to have been made by the appellant to assert his rights until the institution of this suit. The appellee tfstified on the trial that he had allowed the property to remain in Texas to prevent an action against g. Same: him for its recovery, and it is argued that this RemoN'al of property should stop the operation of the statute of limit-to avoid action. ations in this suit. The position is untenable. There is absolutely nothing in the record to show that the remedy i.ow adopted by the appellant could not have been pursued at any time after his cause of action accrued as readily as at the date of the institution of this suit. It follows, then, the statute has run against the appellant's action from the date of the appellee's possession in 1879, or at least from the time the appellant was apprised of the hostile attitude of the possession (Pickens v. Sparks.
■ 46 Ark.] NOVEMBER TERM, 1885. 493 44 Ark., 291; Lawson v. Cunninghanl, 21 454; Woad on Lien, .§ec. 183), and. as 'suit was not coiniteneed within. three year thereafter, the action was barred, and the judgdent must be affirmed.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.