580 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS, [39 Ark. Woodward v. Campbell, Commissioner, etc. WOODWARD V CAMPBELL, COMMISSIONER, ETC. 1. AGENCY : By what acts of officers the State is bound. The State is liable only to the extent of the power actually given to its officers, and not to the extent of their apparent authority; and all who deal with a public agent must, at their peril, inquire into his real power to bind his principal. 2. LEvEx BONDS : No payment for State lands. Payment for land of the State in levee bonds is no payment, and the purchaser acquires no rights thereby. 3. TAX SALES : Redemption; Who entitled to. Almost any right, either in law or equity, perfect or inchoate, in possession or in action, or whether in the nature of a charge or incum-brance on the land, amounts to such an ownership as will entitle the party holding it to redeem the land from tax sale. Certainly a purchaser by executory contract can redeem. APPEAL from Pulaski Circuit Court. Hon. J. W. MARTIN, Circuit Judge. Henderson, & Carru.th, for appellants: Internal improvement lands are subject to taxation after entry. (Section 3925, Gantt's Digest.) The entry still stands, and the forfeitures are presumed to be valid. The assertion of the right to tax is an admission that the title is out
39 Ark.I NOVEMBER TERM, 1882. 581 Woodward v. Campbell, Commissioner, etc. of the State. The certificate demanded was absolutely necessary to enable appellants to redeem. They had no remedy except by mandamus. It was the "plain legal duty" of the Commissioner to issue the certificate. The certificates of entry were assignable. Section 3926
Gantt's Digest. The Treasurer was acting in the discharge of his legal duties and within the scope of • his authority. The receipt was an acknowledgment of payment in full for the lands in money; his act was the act of the State, and the debt was discharged. Benjamin on Sales, 546; Story on Agency, secs. 57-8-9, 60; 6 Barn. c Cress., 175; 73 N. Y., 315; 4 Mo. App., 525; 34 Ohio St., 142; 5 Col., 578; 1 Wy. Ter., 51. Receipts under some circumstances become conclusive and estop parties (1 Woolw., 96; Whctrt. on Ev., vol. 2, 1006) ; and can not be contradicted by parol. 29 Penn. St., 319; Bigelow' on Estoppel, 423-4-5-6-7. The Treasurer was authorized to receive levee bonds, etc. (Sec. 4044, Gantt's Digest.) Even if the action of the Treasurer was improper, he was liable on his bond. The loss shoull not fall on. innocent_thircLparties. The State was concluded by the receipts and the acts of the Treasurer, her agent, etc. She is estopped. See 3 Pickering, 224; 4 Pet., 1; 17 Wall., 32; 4 Binn, 231; 7 Col., 527; 49 Mo., 216; Bigelow on Estoppel, 246. The act had not then been declared not constitutionally passed. Moore, Attorney-General, for appellee: The levee bonds were held void in 33 Ark., 17, and the payment was a nullity. The purchase-money being unpaid, the lands still belong to the State. Sec. 3983, Gantt's Digest. The lands were subject to taxation (sec. 5049, Gantt's
Digest); but should not have been sold, but continued on the
582 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS, [39 Ark. Woodward v. Campbell, Commissioner, etc. tax-books. They could not be declared forfeited, and were not subject to redemption. lb. If the contract had been executed and patents issued before the decision in 33 Ark., 17, the State might have been estopped, but the contract was executory, and there is no obligation on State, nor right for the Commissioner to issue a patent or certify for redemption, as has been held in regard to Confederate money, etc. Smrrn, J. In 1873 Charles W. Tankersley purchased fret-1i the State several thousand acres of internal improvement lands, and made his note for the purchase-price. He afterwards transferred his certificates of purchase to T. B. Mills & Co., and they, on the third of July, 1875, paid to the Treasurer of the State, in levee bonds and coupons, the principal and interest of said notes. The lands were assessed for taxation in the years 1875 and 1876, and, the taxes not having been paid, were declared forfeited to the State. The over-due tax law of March 12, 188 . 1, amended March 22, 1881, gave to the owners of forfeited lands the privilege of redemption within ninety days after its passage. On the sixteenth of June, 1881, the appellants, then the holders of the certificates of purchase issued to Tank-ersley, applied to the Commissioner of State Lands to certify to the Treasurer the amount of taxes, penalties and costs due upon these lands, to the end that they might redeem. This certificate the Commissioner refused to grant. Thereupon they filed their petition for a wiit of mandamus to compel him to certify the amount required to redeem, and to issue to them a patent deed for the lands. The defenses were that the alleged payment in levee bonds was a nullity, and that the lands, being still the property of the State, were erroneously reported as forfeited for taxes.
39 Ark.] NOVEMBER TERM, 1882. 583 Woodward v. Campbell, Commissioner, etc. The act under which the levee bonds were issued, was adjudged in Smithee v. Garth, 33 Ark., 16, not to 1. Agency: Official have been passed in accordance with constitu-acts, by what, State tional requirements. And although that decis- bound. ion had not been rendered when the Treasurer received some of these bonds and coupons in discharge of Tankersley's obligations, yet the act of December 14, 1874, distinctly prohibited him from accepting such funds. The State is liable only to the extent of the power actually given to its officers, and not to the extent of their apparent authority. And all who deal with a public agent must at their peril inquire into his real power to bind bis principal. Story on Agency, sec. 307, a, and cases cited; The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall., 666. The appellant's xight are, then, no other nor greater than if such supposed payment had never been made. 2. Levee The lands are still liable for the debts in-bon N ds . : payment for curred in their purchase. Eeceipts are only State lands. prima facie evidence of payment, open to explanation and contradiction. And this receipt shows on its face that it was paid in an unlawful medium. But the appellants were the equitable owners of the lands; that is, they had the right to go forward and pay the lands out. No question is made but that the sale to Tankersley was authorized by law. The certificates of purchase he received axe expressly made assignable. Gantt's Digest, sec. 3926. The land was subject to taxation after the date of its entry. lb., sec. 3925. While it might have been more regular not to offer these lands for sale for taxes, since a sale would not a Tax have carried the interest of the State, but only Sales: Redemption, who that of Tankersley or his assignees, yet, practi-entitled to. cally, the clerks and collectors can not be acquainted with the precise condition of every parcel of land that the State has sold and whether it has been in fact paid for or not. The legal ef-
584 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS, [39 Ark. Woodward v. Campbell, Commissioner, etc. feet of the forfeiture was the same as if the lands had been returned delinquent, and continued on the tax-books, with the taxes of succeeding years added as they accrued. Gantt's Digest, secs. 3983-4, 5049; Harrison v. Williams, Ante, 315. Statutes providing for redemption from tax sales always receive a liberal construction. Almost any right, either at law or in equity, perfect or inchoate, in possession or in action, or whether in the nature of a charge or incumbrance on the land, amounts to such an ownership as will entitle the party holding it to redeem. Certainly a party claiming the land under an executory contract to purchase it, is the owner within the meaning of the act. Cooley on Taxation, 366; Rice v. Nelson, 27 Iowa, 148; Rogers v. Rutter, 11 Gray, 410. The petitioners are entitled to redeem from the forfeiture, but not to a deed for the lands until they shall have paid the purchase-price. Reversed and remanded with directions to grant the writ prayed for, requiring the Commissioner to certify the amount required for redemption.
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