672 CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE V. BELL. [205 CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE v. BELL. 4298 170 S. W. 2d 666 Opinion delivered April 12, 1943. 1. COURTS—APPEAL—PLEA OF Gillum—There is no right of appeal to the circuit court from a judgment imposed upon a plea of guilty to a charge of crime made in the municipal court. 2. CouRTs—APPEAL.—Where appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of "drunken driving" in violation of § 6707 o . f Pope's Dig., he had no right to appeal to the circuit court and the circuit court should, when his appeal was lodged, have dismissed it on appellant's motion. 3. STATUTES—CONSTRUCTION.—An act approved February 26, 1943, entitled "An Act to clarify the right of appeal in certain misdemeanor cases and to grant justice to persons uninformed of their legal rights" the purpose of which is to grant the right of appeal from judgments of municipal courts entered upon pleas of guilty, but requiring that the motion for an appeal be filed within 30 days of the date of the judgment has no application, since the judgment on appellee's plea of guilty was rendered more than thirty days before the act took effect. Appeal from Washington Circuit Court; J. W. Trimble, Judge; reversed.
ARK..] CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE y . BEL:L. 673 Price Dickson, _for appellant. Jolin Mayes and G. T. Sullins, for appellee. SMITH, J. On November 22, 1942, Appellee Bell entered a plea of guilty in the municipal court of the city of Fayetteville to the charge of "drunken driving," in violation of § 6707 of Pope's Digest. The judgment entered upon this plea imposed a fine of $100, which was i)aid. On December 1, 1942, appellee filed a motion to vacate this judgment, whi.ch was overruled, and from that action an appeal to 'the circuit court was filed on De-cember 9, .1942: On the date last mentioned appellee filed in. the circuit court a motion to amend the judgment of the municipal court, which yas sustained, and an order was entered on that date by the circuit court modifying the judgment of the municipal court "to the extent that the suspension of his right to drive an automobile and the en f . orcement thereof is suspended during the good behavior of the defendant, or until the further orders of this court, and if said license has been canceled he is authorized to obtain a new driver's license, this order being made by reason of the war emergency." The judgment of the municipal court made no order in regard to the cancellation of appellee's license. On January 3, 1943, the attorney for the city of FayetteVille filed a motion to vacate the judgment of the circuit court modifying the judgment of the muniei-pal court. It was alleged in this motion that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to make its order and that the order was made without the knowledge or consent • of the city's attorney. That motion was overruled, and from that action and order is this appeal. The city's attorney makes the concession that it must be taken as true that the municipal - court judgment was modified by consent, but the insistence is that the circuit court lacked authority to make that order for the reason that the judgment of the municipal c -ourt 'was. rendered upon a plea of guilty, from which judgment the right to appeal did not lie.
674 CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE v. BELL. [205 This contention must be sustained upon the authority of the cases of Stokes v. State, 122 Ark. 56, 182 S. W. 521, arid DuclUey v. State, 136 Ark. 453, 206 S. W. 898. In the first of these cases a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor charge was entered and the defendant's punishment fixed at a fine witb imprisonment in the county jail. Within the time allowed by statute he prayed, was granted and perfected an appeal to the circuit court, where be was permitted to withdraw the plea of guilty, which he had entered in the justice's court, and to enter a plea of not guilty. He was then tried in the cir.cuit court upon this plea of not guilty and was found and his fine was increased and his term of imprisonment lengthened, from which judgment be prayed tui appeal to this court. • Upon this state of the record Justice Hart there said: "The circuit court. should have dismissed the appeal of the defendant. The def2indant entered his plea of guilty before the justice of the peace. In doing so 'he confessed himself guilty in the manner and form as charged against him in the information." It was there further said: "The defendant pleaded guilty when fie was arraigned before the justice of the peace and sentence was there pronouneed against him. His plea of guilty as reCeived by the 'court and recorded was an admission of any offense well chayged in the information. Unless it, was .withdrawn by leave of the court there would be nothing left to be done but for the court to pass sentence upon him. The reason is that a plea of guilty is a formal confession of guilt before the court in which the defendent is arraigned, and the court can then only pass sentence as upon a verdict. State v. Wright, 96 Ark. 203, 131 S. W. 688; Clark's Criminal Procedure, pp.-373, 374. "It folloWs that the circuit court erred in not dismissing the appeal of the defendant and for that error the judgment will be : reversed and the appeal of the defendant from the justice of the peace court to the circuit court will be dismissed." Under substantially similar facts the holding in the case of Stokes v. State, supra, was approved in the case
AtiK.] 675 of Dudney v. State, supra, where the same order was entered, that order being to reverse the judgment of the circuit court and to remand the cause to that court with directions to dismiss the appeal. See . , also, Duncan V. State, 125 Ark. 4, 187 S. W. 906. -The same order must be entered here and the judgment will be reversed and the cause will be • remanded to the circuit ceurt with directions to dismiss the appeal to that court. Such action will then be taken as conforms to the law. Sections 6852 and 6853, Pope's Digest. At the recent session .of the General Assembly an Act was passed, with an emergency clause attached, which was approved February 26, 1943, entitled "An A.ct to clalify the right of appeal in . certain misdemeanor cases. and to grant justice to persons uninfoymed of their legal rights." -The purpose . of the act appears to be to grant the right of 'appeal from the judgments of ma-nicipal, justice's or mayor's coUrts entered upon pleas of guilty upon compliance with the conditions there specified. This act has no application here for the reason that it requires the motion for an appeal to be filed within 30 days of the date of the judgment,-from which it was sought to appeal, and that time expired before the act becamd effective. 'Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.