454 WADE V..THORNBROLIGH, COMM. OF LABOR. [231 WADE V. THORNBROUGH, COmm. OF LABOR. r 5-2091 330 S:W. 2d 100
Opinion delivered, December 21, -1959. 1.: SO C' IAL*SECURITY - UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS ' 2-- ' QUALIFICATION,- URGENT PERSONAL EMERGENCY wITHIN mEANING OF . 'EXEMPTION FROM. --, Appellant who quit work to care for her five , children when they contracted measles, contends that the commis-, sioner instead of disqualifying her for benefits under Ark. Stats. § 81-1106 (e), pertaining to female claimants who leave jobs to , perform household duties, 'should have held . hbr eligible for benefits .'under the provisions of' Ark. Stats. § '81-1106(a); which exempts, • from disqualification where they voluntarily leave their jobs be-pause of an "urgent personal erhergency". HELD: Appellant , was • not . disqualified for benefits, since she was confronted with a per-, sonal emergency of such "compelling urgency that it would be '. contrary to good conscience to impose a disqualification": 2: SOCIAL SECURITY - UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS - DISQUALIFICATION, DELAY IN FILING CLAIM AFTER' CESSATION OF URGENT PERSONAL EMERGENCY AS GROUNDS FOR. - Employer contends that • since claimant' remained at home to perform household duties for a considerable time after the cessation of her "urgent personal emerzency", she should be disqualified under Ark. Stats. § 81-1106 (e) pertaining to females who , quit to marry, perform household duties, etc. HELD: The contention is witheut merit since the reason for the employee's separation from her work and not the speed of filing her claim determines her eligibility. Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Second Division ; Guy Amsler, Judge ; reversed and remanded., -
ARK.] WADE v. THORNBROUGH, COMM. OF LABOR. 455 J. Gayle Windsor, Jr., for apPellant; I Luke Arnett, for appellee. J. SEABORN HOLT, AsSociate Justice. ApPellant, lian Wade, brings this appeal from a' judgment of the Pulaski County Circnit Court denying her claim for un= employment compenSatiOn 'under the 'provision g of our Employment SecuritY Act, Sections 81-4101-81-1122, Ark. Stats., 1947 (CumulatiVe Supplement). The circuit, court reviewed and affirmed the action of the Arkansas Board of Review, which had denied appellant's claim for , benefits because she was disqualified under the provisiOns of Section 5 (e); of the Employment Se7 curity Act , (Sec. 814106 (e) Ark. Stats.), for the reason that she voluntarily. left her last employment to perform customary househ , old , duties. Appellees are the Commissioner of Labor, Administrator of the, Employment Security Division,- and the AMF Cycle, , Corn-pany, appellant's former employer. Material facts are not in dispute. , Appellant testified that, she last ' worked for AMF CYcle CompanY on May. 10, 19 . 58 and ihat she quit work on that date "because my, children had the measles and I couldn't gei a;leave of absence. I t asked for a month's leave of absence but Mr.; Railey, our personnel manager, Said he couldn't get me a leave tor, that long., -It was about a month and a half before.all of them got over -the measles: : My husband was woriiing , and I couldn't get anybody to take care of them. Mr.,Railey told me that as soon as I got to where I could work, to call : him )1 called him on September 22, 1958,. and he said he didu't have anything -to, do now and he; would, let me know -when he had work. didn't call sooner, :because the children were out of school during the_ summer., * * Ile said if I was sick,_ I-could get leave, , but for sick children or my huSband, I couldn !t get a , Appellant says, "The Commissioner erred aS'a /nat-ter of la*, in that he applied the wrong' section of the statute lit deterniithrig" appellant'S eligibility for nn6m-
456 WADE V. THORNBROUGH, COMM. OF LABOR. [231 ployment benefits. Instead of disqualifying the claimant under Sec. 81-1106 (e) of th6 Act, pertaining to female claimants who leave jobs to marry, perform customary household duties, follow their husbands, or because of pregnancy; appellant instead should have been held eligible for benefits under the provisions of Sec. 81-1106 (a), which exempts claimants from disqualifica-fion if they voluntarily leave their jobs because of an urgent personal emergency." On the record before us, the facts being undisputed, a question of law is presented. Appellee says: "The appellant (Lillian Wade) makes only one contention for a reversal in this case in that the Commissioner erred as a matter of law in that he applied the wrong section of the statute in determining claimant's eligibility for unemployment benefits. Instead of disqualifying her under Sec. 81-1106 (e) of the Act pertaining to female claimants who leave work to perform customary house duties, * * * that appellant should have been held eligible for benefits under proviso of Sec. 81-1106 (a)." Section 81-1106 (e) provides that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits — "5 (e) (1) If a female claimant voluntarily leaves her work to marry or perform customary household duties. Such disqualification shall continue until she has had 30 days of paid work subsequent to the date of her separation." . Mrs. Wade earnestly contends that she did not quit her work to "perform customary household duties" within the meaning of this section, but that she quit because of a personal emergency of such nature and compelling urgency that it would be contrary to good conscience to impose a disqualification and that she is relying upon the provisions of Sec. 81-1106 (a) (cited as Section 5 (a)) the relevant portions being: " (An individual shall be disqualified for benefits :) '5 (a) If he voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work, left his last work. Such disqualification shall be for eight weeks of unemployment . . . Provided . . . no individual shall be disqualified under this subsection if after making reasonable efforts to preserve his job rights
ARK.] WADE V. THORNBROUGH, COMM. OF LABOR. 45 he left his last work because of a personal emerg ency of such nature and compelling urg ency that it would be contrary , to good conscience to impose a disqualification.' " We have reached the conclusion that appellant is correct in her contention. We cannot agree with appellees' contention that when Mrs. Wade's five children contracted measles and that when she , quit work to care for them, that it amounted to nothing more than one of the customary household duties imposed upon her, as a mother, to perform; rather, we think that she was confronted, in effect, with a personal emergency of such "compelling urgency that it would be contrary to good conscience to impose a disqualification" and therefore, she was justified in quitting her work on May 10, 1958 and was not disqualified for benefits under this section. Finally, appellees contend that Mrs. Wade is barred from asserting any claim for the reason that she failed to file any during the time of the personal emergency. In this connection, appellees say: ",* * * when the claim was filed, no personal emergency was claimed to exist.or had existed for the past three months, and therefore, proviso of Sec. 81-1106 (a) was not involved, as no emergency existed and had not existed for three months. It is unquestioned in the record that during all the period of time between May 10 and September 23 claimant was performing household duties, and that Sec. 81-1106 (e) should be invoked at least after about June 25 and she continued to remain at home to perform household duties at a time no personal emergency existed." We do not agree with this cOntention for the reason that we find no requirement, expr6ssed or implied, in section 5 (e) above that a claim must be' filed during the emergency nor at any particular time thereafter. The reason for Mrs. Wade's separation from her work and not the speed of filing her claim determines the actual eligibility of a claimant. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.