

ARK. RACING COMMISSION *v.* HOT SPRINGS KENNEL CLUB,
INC.

5-2177

339 S. W. 2d 126

Opinion delivered October 3, 1960.

[Rehearing denied November 7, 1960]

1. LICENSES — NOTICE OF REVOCATION — DAY IN COURT, FULL HEARING AT REQUEST OF INTERESTED PARTY AS. — Racing Commission, after revocation of temporary dog racing license, granted a full scale hearing at the request of the Kennel Club. *HELD*: The Kennel Club had its day in court with ample notice.
2. LICENSES — GREYHOUND RACING, REVOCATION OF AS DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW. — A franchise granted by the State to conduct dog racing, just as a franchise to sell liquor, is a privilege, and not a property right, which may be taken away by the State.
3. LICENSES — GREYHOUND RACING FRANCHISE, GROUNDS FOR REVOKING TEMPORARY PERMIT. — Contention that temporary dog racing franchise could only be revoked for one of the two causes mentioned in Ark. Stats. § 84-2826 held without merit in view of the other provisions of the Act with respect to the protection of the public interest in investigating and selecting the character of people who propose to conduct dog racing.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — FINDINGS OF FACT BY BOARDS & COMMISSIONS, EXTENT OF REVIEW BY COURTS ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI. — Upon a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the findings of a board or commission charged to investigate and determine certain facts, the Circuit Court proceeds to review the findings, not by a trial *de novo*, but for errors of law only.
5. LICENSES — REVOCATION OF GREYHOUND RACING FRANCHISE, WEIGHT & SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. — Suspicious and unexplained activities of promoters of Kennel Club, organized for dog racing purposes, in expending large sums of money and in acquiring 90% instead of 20% of the stock as previously indicated, held sufficient to substantiate finding of Racing Commission in revoking Club's franchise.

Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Second Division;
Guy Amsler, Judge; reversed.

Conway & Webber, for appellant.

Warren & Bullion, by *Eugene Warren*, for appellee.

JIM JOHNSON, Associate Justice. The question for decision is: Did the Racing Commission act contrary to

the law and the evidence in cancelling the temporary franchise of the Hot Springs Kennel Club, Inc.?

A general review of the events leading up to the cancellation of appellee's temporary franchise will, we believe, lead to a better perspective of the issues here involved. Very briefly they are as set out below.

March 8, 1957, Act 191 of 1957 (Ark. Stats. §§ 84-2801 to 84-2842) was approved, authorizing dog racing in Arkansas under the supervision of the Arkansas Racing Commission.

December 6, 1957, the Hot Springs Kennel Club, Inc., was incorporated. Eleven days thereafter the articles of incorporation were amended to issue 500,000 shares of promotional stock.

February 6, 1958, the Kennel Club filed with the Racing Commission its application for a temporary franchise. It was known by everyone at that time that dog racing would first have to be approved by the electors in Garland County.

On May 6, 1958, an election was held. It was not known whether the results of the election were favorable to dog racing until the decision of this court became final on May 20, 1959—holding that dog racing had been approved.

By July 1, 1959, it had become known that there were disputing factions existing in the Kennel Club. The directors appeared before the Commission where these disputes were examined by the Commission. Ned Stewart, as chairman and spokesman for the Racing Commission, warned the Kennel Club that it must get its house in order or their franchise would be revoked.

On August 12, 1959, it appearing to the Commission that the Kennel Club had not heeded the warning of the Racing Commission, the Kennel Club's temporary franchise was revoked.

On September 4, 1959, after the Kennel Club had requested a hearing, a full hearing was held before the

gives the privilege and it can take away that privilege by the same token. In this instance it appears from the record that the Kennel Club had spent approximately \$70,000 at the time its temporary franchise was revoked. This, of course, does constitute a loss of money by the Kennel Club, however, Ark. Stats. § 84-2826 (A) makes it very clear that if the law is not complied with the Kennel Club could have its franchise cancelled after it had spent approximately a million dollars. The Kennel Club had access to "due process of law" when it had a full hearing before the Racing Commission, before the Circuit Court, and now before this Court.

However, regardless of the reasons assigned by the trial court for reversing the Commission, it still remains to be considered whether the Commission was justified, under the law and the facts, in cancelling the temporary franchise. The several arguments presented by appellee to sustain the judgment of the Circuit Court in reversing the order of the Commission are included under the following groupings: (a) The franchise could be revoked only for one of the causes contained in the statutes and, in the alternative, (b) the testimony given at the hearing did not justify the Commission in revoking the temporary franchise.

(a) We cannot agree that the temporary franchise could be revoked only for one of the two causes mentioned in the statute. The statute referred to is Ark. Stats. § 84-2826. In substance, this statute provides that the temporary franchise *shall be forfeited* if appellee fails to acquire a site and commence construction of buildings and facilities within 90 days after notification of the result of the election. It further provides if such construction is begun and appellee fails to complete it and be open for business within one year after the end of the aforesaid 90 day period, in accordance with the plans and specifications, the Commission *shall cancel* the temporary franchise. In the first place it will be noted, and we think it is significant, that in these instances the Commission has been given no discretion. To so limit the power of the

Commission to cancel a temporary franchise would make it an automation, and would not be in harmony with other provisions of the dog racing statute. Ark. Stats. § 84-2819, which defines the power and duty of the Commission, among other things, provides that the Commission shall "hear and determine all matters properly coming before the Commission, and grant rehearings thereon. Take such other action, not inconsistent with law, as it may deem necessary or desirable to supervise and regulate, and to effectively control *in the public interest*, Greyhound Racing in the State of Arkansas." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is not disputed that the Commission has the right and duty to investigate thoroughly in selecting the character of people who propose to conduct dog racing before a temporary franchise is issued. This is in line with the Commission's duty to protect the public interest. If, after the Commission had selected proper personnel and had issued a temporary franchise, the personnel should be changed to include undesirable characters, it would be almost ridiculous to say that the Commission was powerless to revoke the franchise. To accept appellee's contention in this matter would amount to eliminating all distinction between the words "temporary franchise" and "permanent franchise", and would leave the Commission powerless to protect the public interest.

(b) *Was the Commission Justified by the Evidence.* Having arrived at the conclusion that the Commission has the power to exercise discretion, we now proceed to consider whether or not it was justified in this instance in revoking appellee's temporary franchise. However, before proceeding to this discussion it is necessary to determine the rule by which the Circuit Court must review the findings of the Commission on a Writ of Certiorari.

If the Circuit Court in this instance was authorized and empowered to try the issue *de novo*, this fact would lend support to an affirmance of its judgment reversing the Commission, but even then, we think, it would not be a justification. However, the Circuit Court in this instance had no right to try the case *de novo*. In the case of

Merchants & Planters Bank v. Fitzgerald, 61 Ark. 605, 33 S. W. 1064, among other things, said: "but it does not follow that the court, on hearing the writ, proceeds *de novo* and tries the case as if it had never been heard in the inferior court . . . the office of the writ . . . is merely to review for errors of law." See also *Hall v. Bledso*, 126 Ark. 125, 189 S. W. 1041; *Dixie Downs, Inc. v. Arkansas Racing Commission*, 219 Ark. 356, 242 S. W. 2d 132, and *North Hill Memorial Gardens v. Hicks*, 230 Ark. 787, 326 S. W. 2d 797. In the *Hicks* case the Cemetery Board, pursuant to Act 250 of 1953, issued a permit to one Russell to construct and maintain a cemetery near North Little Rock. Aggrieved parties applied to the Chancery Court to enjoin Russell. Following a hearing the Chancellor revoked the Board's permit. On appeal this Court reversed the Chancellor and in doing so approved this rule: "It has been uniformly held by this Court that where Boards are lawfully appointed and charged with the duty to investigate and determine certain facts, the court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of the Board, and the judgment of the Board provided for the purpose of ascertaining the facts is controlling unless there is evidence that it was *arbitrarily exercised*." (Emphasis Supplied) In addition to the above, this Court in that same case also said: "The burden of proving that the Board's action in granting appellants' permit was arbitrary rested on the appellees." In applying the above announced rules to the case under consideration, it is in order to see whether the Commission was justified by the testimony in revoking the temporary franchise. This question we now proceed to examine.

A careful reading of the voluminous testimony taken before the Commission on September 4, 1959, reveals, in substance, the following situation with reference to the Kennel Club at the time of the hearing. When the application for a temporary franchise was filed February 6, 1958, the Kennel Club had been incorporated. The application showed that among others the directors included Charles S. Harriman, Alex T. Jamieson and Milan S. Creighton.

testimony given at the hearing is sufficient, we think, to justify the action of the Commission.

J. O. Bennett. Mr. Bennett testified that when Mr. Creighton approached him about stock in the Kennel Club that he asked Mr. Creighton “. . . if this was going to be for the benefit of the people of Arkansas, and be governed by the people of Arkansas, and he assured me it was, and I said in a case like that I will be glad to go along with you, but if it's going to result in two or three hogging it up, and be in court like this West Memphis track, then I didn't care to get into it.” He said that Creighton assured him that he and Mr. Harriman would take approximately 20% of the entire issue to promote the deal. He further stated that: “We find now that there was very little stock that had been used for promotion.” Q. “Now what was the purpose in asking for the additional 50,000?” A. “Something they promised somewhere, they wouldn't tell us. We asked if they would give us the names it was going to and they wouldn't give us the names.” Bennett further testified that he objected to hiring Mr. Harriman at \$18,000 a year plus an unlimited expense account. He also stated: “Personally I can't go along with that and I will resign and you can get someone in my place . . . and that is the last meeting I attended.” The witness stated that he still owned 5,000 shares of stock for which he paid \$2,500, although his name apparently did not appear on the books (a partial explanation of this was offered).

BRUCE STREETT. This witness has 5,000 shares of stock for which he paid \$2,500. He testified, “I do not agree with the policies of Mr. Creighton and Harriman . . . and very openly and perhaps rather bluntly expressed my disagreement.” He stated that he was testifying merely because he had been given a subpoena, and that he held no ill will toward anyone. Mr. Streett further stated that he was astonished when Mr. Creighton first made the proposition that he and the other three promoters wanted 500,000 shares. He stated that when Creighton first talked to him about it he asked him this question: “Creighton, is the thing going to be eaten up

and from then on step by step it went from bad to worse.” Kuhn is no longer a member of the Board.

RICHARD W. HOBBS. This witness was originally the attorney for the organization and was paid \$5,000 for his services. He stated that when he filed the application on February 6, 1958, for a temporary franchise that he made it out like Mr. Creighton told him to, and no mention was made of promotion stock. He testified that the application stated that: “The present stockholders have purchased and fully paid for a sufficient amount of stock so as to enable the corporation to proceed with its corporate purpose and by agreement no stock will be sold to anyone other than the original stockholders unless the original stockholders do not fully subscribe to all of the authorized issue. In any event whatever stock remains unsold will be offered to the citizens of Arkansas.” In speaking of the directors meeting the witness stated that: “Mr. Creighton was then questioned as to why they had used such a small proportion of the half a million shares when they were supposed to use the stock and why they in turn used the corporate cash rather than the stock in getting the election over and for promotional purposes, and they had no explanation other than they had used that much and that was all.” In speaking of what occurred at the directors meeting, the witness further stated: “I told them I didn’t want to have any part of that (referring to promotional stock). I had rather not even listen to it, and I asked to be excused, and I left the room.” Q. “Well, why didn’t you want to know?” A. “I will say I think I discussed it with Mr. Streett at the time and I told him I didn’t like the smell of it.”

Mr. Creighton testified at length and although he was pressed to do so he failed to give the Commission any explanation of what use he had made of the promotional stock or the money paid into the corporation by the stockholders relative to the expense of the election and the litigation. The record reveals that over \$50,000 had been paid for stock and that less than \$11,000 was in the treasury. Also, this appears in his testimony: Q. “Mr. Creighton,

there has been some litigation filed against this Kennel Club with which the Commission is familiar. Let me ask you this, what percentage of the stock does your group represent?" A. "Our group represents in excess of, I believe it's in excess of 90 per cent; might be 1 or 2 points either way, but approximately."

So the picture before the Commission was that Creighton and his group, who were supposed to have 20% of the stock to get the "show on the road" now has 90% of the stock, and the treasury is nearly depleted; large sums of money had been and were still to be expended for suspicious and unexplained purposes, and; the activities of Creighton and his group were such that some of the original stockholders felt obliged to sever their connections with the Board even at the risk of losing the money they had invested.

In view of that picture, this Court is unable to say the Commission acted arbitrarily or even that it acted against the weight of the evidence. Consequently the judgment of the Circuit Court should be, and it is hereby reversed.

GEORGE ROSE SMITH and ROBINSON, JJ., dissent.