Court of Appeals

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 120

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION II

No. CV-22-405

 

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

 

This appeal is from the November 18 and December 23, 2021 orders from the Searcy County Circuit Court regarding a dispute over the ownership of real property known as the Bear Creek Farm. The orders (1) granted the claims of appellees James Daniel and the estate of George Daniel for unjust enrichment, declaratory judgment, and quiet title; (2) imposed a constructive trust on the relevant property and ordered Wilma Sharon Daniel, as the personal representative of the estate of Charles Daniel, to convey two separate undivided one-third interests in the property—one to James Daniel and one to the estate of George Daniel; (3) denied the counterclaim filed by the estate of Charles Daniel; and (4) found that Wilma Sharon Daniel had no dower interest in the separate one-third interests granted to James Daniel and the estate of George Daniel.

Appellants, the estate of Charles Daniel and Wilma Sharon Daniel, argued below, and continue to dispute, that any agreement regarding ownership of the disputed land was reached among brothers Charles Daniel, George Daniel, and James Daniel in 1977; however, they focus their appellate arguments on why the circuit court’s orders should be reversed—that the appellees’ causes of action were barred because the statute of limitations had long since run—even assuming the brothers actually entered into the alleged agreement. We affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

This case is a dispute over the ownership of roughly 413 acres of real property known as the Bear Creek Farm in Searcy County near Marshall, Arkansas. Charles, George, and James Daniel were brothers. The Bear Creek Farm property is “family” land having been given to their uncle Jesse Ferguson by their maternal grandfather many decades ago. Jesse and his wife, Mary Lou, entered into a contract to sell the Bear Creek Farm to Charles on April 30, 1977. The contract sale price was $100,000 with $30,000 to be paid on July 1, 1977, followed by annual $17,500 payments plus interest to be paid thereafter, with the last payment to be paid on July 1, 1981. The only mention of either George or James is that James prepared and notarized the contract.

Consistent with the contract, Jesse and Mary Lou also executed a warranty deed with relinquishment of dower to Charles on April 30, 1977. The deed conveyed the Bear Creek Farm property solely to Charles. It was also prepared and notarized by James. The deed was recorded on August 7, 1981, also consistent with the contract’s payment provisions.

But the appellees say the contract and the deed do not accurately reflect the entire story. They submit that the three brothers entered into an oral agreement among themselves to buy the Bear Creek Farm together for an actual sale price of $150,000. George provided the initial $50,000 cash down payment, James chipped in somewhere around $17,000 at some point, which was all he could do, and Charles paid the remaining approximately $83,000 balance, plus interest.

According to the appellees, the reasons for titling the property in Charles’s name only were very specific. At the time, George ran the family hardware store, and in the 1970s he had sold a gun to someone without following the correct federal paperwork procedure and had been indicted because the buyer had used the gun to kill several people. Also, James contended at trial (for the first time) that George was facing possible liability as a member of the board of a local bank for financial irregularities at the bank. Both circumstances caused Charles to fear that titling the Bear Creek Farm property in George’s name would put the property at risk to the extent of George’s interest. For James’s part, Charles likewise did not want to place title in James’s name because James was having marital issues, and he did not want to lose any interest in the property to James’s wife in the event of a divorce.

According to the appellees, the plan was that title to the Bear Creek Farm property initially would be held only in Charles’s name. He would hold the property in that manner until the other two brothers’ legal troubles resolved and then convey it to them and himself in equal one-third interests.

After the 1977 contract to purchase the Bear Creek Farm property was executed by Charles, the three brothers apparently operated the farm as joint owners, holding themselves out to the world and to each other as equal owners of the farm and equally sharing in certain income from the farm. But there is nothing in the record to indicate that either George or James took steps to enforce Charles’s agreement to convey an interest to them after their legal troubles resolved, as alleged to be a condition of their 1977 agreement. It is undisputed that those legal troubles had resolved for both George and James by the early 1980s.

Instead, they waited until Charles died on September 11, 2019, and then made demand on Sharon. The pleadings indicate that at the time of Charles’s death, the Bear Creek Farm property was titled just as it had been in 1977, solely in Charles’s name. When Sharon refused, in her capacity as administrator of Charles’s estate, to convey any interest in the property to George or James in April 2020, they commenced the underlying action on May 29 against Charles’s estate. George and James sued for the imposition of a constructive trust, to quiet title, and for a declaratory judgment, all related to their ownership in the 413-acre Bear Creek Farm property.

George died after the suit was commenced. Alice Daniel, his widow, and Sarah Oxner, his daughter, filed a first amended complaint as co-executrixes of George’s estate, along with James, against Charles’s estate and Sharon, on July 2, 2021. In her answer to this first amended complaint, Sharon, both individually and as personal representative of Charles’s estate, raised the statute of limitations as a defense for the first time.

The appellants moved for summary judgment, contending the relevant statute of limitations barred relief to appellees George’s estate and James, assuming the agreement even existed. They argued that Charles would have been in breach of that agreement when he failed to convey to George and James their respective interests when their legal troubles resolved, which would have been by the early 1980s at the latest. They argued that George’s and James’s causes of action accrued then, which is outside any limitations period for a suit filed in 2020. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that questions of fact existed on the limitations question without specifying what they were.

A three-day trial was held in October 2021. George, who was deceased by the time of trial, testified by video deposition about the reasons Charles had held legal title for him. George explained that he had been indicted over his failure to use a new federal-firearms form that required questioning a prospective purchaser about mental illness, and a particular purchaser was subsequently committed to the State hospital following a homicidal episode. George acknowledged that he had also been indicted in a separate matter and was facing possible civil liabilities from both predicaments. He maintained that for these reasons, Charles agreed to hold title for his benefit.

George also testified that Charles had also agreed to hold legal title for James. He noted that James had marital problems early on, before 1977, which were resolved within five years. James also had a potential civil liability associated with his banking job. George explained that the three brothers had agreed Charles would hold title on a temporary basis. “Yes, Charles was gonna take it just in his name [until] after our legal and domestic problems were cleared up. . . .” George testified he did not remember ever asking Charles to reconvey the property.

Attorney:    Do you remember in Charles’s lifetime you asking him to go ahead and deed you a third of Bear Creek?

 

George:        Well, to tell the truth, I thought it had already been done. I just never did think about it. I don’t know why we didn’t—he didn’t bring me a deed. I don’t know[. . . .] I didn’t have to know, I guess.

 

Attorney:    After your legal difficulties regarding the federal indictment got cleared up, you never then—

 

George:        No.

 

Attorney:    —approached Charles and said, hey, the coast is clear—

 

George:        I figured—I figured that it might have been done that way[.]

 

James testified that his only request to Charles was after September 2017. He asked Charles, on the heels of family illnesses, to realign legal title.

Attorney:    And so, when you asked Charles about getting a deed and he said what, don’t worry about it, or I’m getting around to that, or what was his response?

 

James:             I think he said he’d take care of it.

 

Attorney:    Okay. And he never did?

 

James:             Not that we know of.

 

Charles did not reconvey legal title to George and James prior to Charles’s death.

George:        Well, after — after my litigation got straightened out, we could straighten it up later. We just didn’t—we just put it off. . . . We just never did get around to it after we bought it.

 

James testified that legal title was expected to be “changed when our legal troubles were over with,” and on cross-examination, James explained:

Attorney:    So, this three-way brother agreement that wasn’t written down, that was temporary in nature, wasn’t a term of that agreement that Charles was—had something he had to do at some point in time?

 

James:             Yes, sir.

 

Attorney:    And if it’s a— if it’s an agreement, if it’s a contract, that’s an obligation Charles had?

 

James:             Yes.

 

Attorney:    So, this thoroughly professional and meticulous person who loves his brothers very much, he breached that promise by not doing what he promised to do, if we believe your story?

 

James:             Yes.

 

James echoed George’s testimony about why legal title was not realigned sooner: they “didn’t think about it anymore. We didn’t worry about that.”

The testimony indicated that the Daniel brothers enjoyed life-long confidential relationships as close-knit siblings and that procrastination in details like the realignment of legal title was common for the Daniel brothers. George’s wife, Alice, testified that “[i]t was supposed to have been fixed at a later after the problems with the law—after, you know, the litigation was over it was supposed to be fixed. But they were kind of bad at procrastinating, so they didn’t get it done.” Even Sharon admitted, regarding a different arrangement and in a recorded conversation, that “of course, they screwed around and didn’t even get the store stuff done.”

The Daniel brothers’ sister, Grace “Jackie” Bianchi, testified that she was not surprised that George and James were not listed on the Bear Creek Farm property deed.

Attorney:    Does that surprise you?

Jackie:            Yes and no.

Attorney:    Okay. And why do you say yes and no?

Jackie:            Because actually, I’m sorry to say, my family—we’re sort of procrastinators. We don’t get around and do a lot of things. We just take each other at our word. You do this, I’ll do that, and so, it doesn’t surprise me.

 

Jackie did seem surprised, however, by Sharon’s refusal to honor Charles’s agreement regarding the property.

Attorney:    So, you have had a conversation with Sharon about who owned Bear Creek?

 

Jackie:            Many through the years. This is going on for 40 years.

Attorney:    Okay. And who did Sharon—who did Sharon know owned it?

Jackie:            She knew that the three brothers owned the property together.

Attorney:    Okay. So, if she testified the she had no idea that George or James claimed an ownership in Bear Creek, that would be inaccurate?

 

Jackie:            That would very much be inaccurate.

Sarah Oxner, George’s daughter, echoed Sharon’s prior knowledge of George’s and James’s ownership in the Bear Creek Farm property.

And then I said to her, I said, Aunt Sharon, first off before we even talk further, are you really gonna sit here and tell me that Bear Creek is not owned by George, James, and Charles? Because we all know better, you know better. She said, oh, I know that. She said, but I don’t have to like it, and I’ve heard that over and over and over in my head since all this started. And she told me flat out that she knew that.

 

After this admission by Sharon around Christmas 2019, Sarah recorded an April 7, 2020, phone call with her. The call followed Sharon’s final meeting with George and James after she had repudiated their ownership of the Bear Creek Farm property. In that call, Sharon was recorded acknowledging the Daniel brothers’ joint purchase and ownership of the Bear Creek Farm property. Sharon said,

What I told your father, Sarah, was that Charles wanted Bear Creek. That’s what I told your father.  Now, he says Charles never told me that. . . . I’m not saying, Sarah, that your father’s wrong . . . in what he’s thinking.  I’m just saying that that’s what Charles wanted me to do.

 

(Emphasis added.) Sharon admitted knowing that George paid $50,000 toward the $150,000 purchase price and that James later tried to pay Charles the difference for his $50,000 third of the price, but Charles declined. But Sharon testified to the contrary at trial, claiming she had no knowledge about the ownership of Bear Creek Farm prior to Charles’s death.

George’s deposition testimony was that Sharon had visited him three times after Charles’s death, and she had offered him $200,000 for his interest in the Bear Creek Farm property. “I was in bed. And she came down and sat on the side of my bed, and she said she would give me $200,000 for Bear Creek[.]” The final meeting occurred in April 2020, with George, James, and Sharon present. Afterward, George and James commenced their May 2020 suit.

The appellants moved for a directed verdict—or judgment as a matter of law—on the statute-of-limitations grounds at the close of the appellees’ case and again at the close of all of the evidence. The circuit court denied both motions and held that the appellees’ causes of action did not accrue until Sharon refused to deed any interest in the property to them after Charles had died.

Nowhere in the record is there testimony that specified that Charles was required to immediately convey legal title to George and James in equal one-thirds without delay after George’s concerns about federal indictments and financial liabilities subsided and James’s concerns about his marriage and financial liability were resolved.

The circuit court ruled from the bench that equity demanded the imposition of a constructive trust on the Bear Creek Farm property. The circuit court’s written order of November 18, 2021, found the brothers’ agreement was repudiated by Sharon, in her capacity as executrix of Charles’s estate, in April 2020, one month before George and James commenced the case below. A timely notice of appeal was filed on December 1. The circuit court entered an amended order on December 23 that reiterated the imposition of the constructive trust imposed by the previous order and the denial of Charles’s estate’s counterclaim. It also declared that Sharon Daniel had no dower interest in the separate one-third interests granted to the appellees, and it granted their claims for unjust enrichment, declaratory judgment, and quiet title. A timely amended notice of appeal adding the amended final order was filed by Charles’s estate and Sharon on December 27, 2021.

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

The circuit court’s resolution of disputes by imposing a constructive trust is reviewed for clear error. Cox v. Miller, 363 Ark. 54, 64, 210 S.W.3d 842, 848 (2005); Gregory v. Gregory, 2013 Ark. App. 57, at 2–3, 425 S.W.3d 845, 847. The test on review is not whether we are convinced that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the circuit court’s findings but whether we can say that the circuit court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Gregory, 2013 Ark. App. 57, at 2, 425 S.W.3d at 847. This court “defer[s] to the superior position of the chancellor to evaluate the evidence.” Cox, 363 Ark. at 64, 210 S.W.3d at 848.

III. Discussion

The appellants acknowledge that this appeal turns on when the appellees’ causes of action to enforce the agreement they entered into with Charles accrued—thus beginning the statute-of-limitations period. They claim it was when the conditions that prevented them from taking title, their legal troubles, were removed in the early 1980s rather than when Sharon refused to convey to them any interest in the property in 2020, approximately forty years later.

The appellants argue that the circuit court erred when it found that the case was not time-barred. They assert that George and James had complete causes of action to enforce their agreement with Charles to convey to them each a one-third interest in the Bear Creek Farm when their legal troubles passed in, at the latest, 1982. They cite Davidson v. Sanders, 235 Ark. 161, 357 S.W.2d 510 (1962), and Helms v. University of Missouri–Kansas City, 65 Ark. App. 155, 986 S.W.2d 419 (1999), in support of their contention that the right to commence an action against Charles to compel him to live by the terms of the agreement came to fruition at that moment. Accordingly, the appellants submit that is when the causes of action accrued and time limitations began to run, not some forty years later when Sharon declined to transfer to them their interests in the Bear Creek Farm.

The appellants submit that many cases hold that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues, and time limitations begin to run, when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action. See Parkerson v. Lincoln, 347 Ark. 29, 32, 61 S.W.3d 146, 148 (2001); Helms, 65 Ark. App. at 160–61, 986 S.W.2d at 422. That occurs “when one party has, by words or conduct, indicated to the other that the agreement is being repudiated or breached.” Helms, 65 Ark. App. at 161, 986 S.W.2d at 422. Stated another way, “[w]hen a party to a contract has, either by words or conduct, manifested a definite intention not to perform, that party has repudiated the contract, and the other party may treat the contract as ended.” Hansen v Hansen, 2011 Ark. App. 586, at 5.

The agreement appellees say they reached with Charles included Charles conveying to them their interests in the Bear Creek Farm property when their legal troubles resolved. Those troubles passed, yet Charles failed to convey the brothers’ interests. The appellants maintain that is most assuredly “conduct” indicating to George and James “that the agreement [was] being repudiated or breached” in the early 1980s. We disagree.

The appellants maintain that the same standard gives birth to both a cause of action for breach of contract and a cause of action to prevent unjust enrichment where the remedy is imposition of a constructive trust. Both accrue when the underlying agreement is repudiated. And repudiation occurs when the person said to be in breach “has, either by words or conduct, manifested a definite intention not to perform. . . .” Hansen, 2011 Ark. App. 586, at 5. The parties agree that when either cause of action accrues by that repudiation, the statute of limitations begins to run. See Walker v. Biddle, 225 Ark. 654, 657, 284 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1956); Helms, 65 Ark. App. at 160–61, 986 S.W.2d at 422.

The question at hand is when that necessary act of repudiation occurred. The appellants urge that it happened when Charles “manifested a definite intention not to perform,” which is what repudiation means, see Hansen, 2011 Ark. App. 586, at 5, when he failed to convey to George and James any interest in the Bear Creek Farm property after their legal troubles had resolved. They argue that Charles continued that manifestation of an intention not to perform for nearly forty years. Either cause of action accrued in the early 1980s, and they maintain that the statute of limitations began to run then as well. See Davidson, 235 Ark. at 169–70, 357 S.W.2d at 515 (holding that the cause of action on which a constructive trust is based accrues when the person obligated to convey the property repudiates the obligation).

The appellants assert that the implication of this reasoning is that repudiation happens upon the occurence of the condition requiring the holder of legal title to transfer it to another for whose benefit he or she holds it, and the transfer is not made. In Davidson, repudiation happened when the debt was paid, and Otis did not transfer the property. They cite Bramlett v. Selman, 268 Ark. 457, 597 S.W.2d 80 (1980), as an example of repudiation when Selman’s divorce was final and Bramlett did not transfer the property as agreed. They maintain that repudiation occurred when George’s and James’s legal troubles resolved, and Charles did not timely transfer title to the Bear Creek Farm property to George and James as agreed.

We disagree and hold that the causes of action at issue accrued when Sharon repudiated her deceased husband’s agreement with George and James to reconvey title to their agreed-upon interests in the Bear Creek Farm property to them. Thus, the three-year (or seven-year) statute-of-limitations period began when Sharon refused their request. “A cause of action for breach of contract accrues the moment the right to commence an action comes into existence, and occurs when one party has, by words or conduct, indicated to the other that the agreement is being repudiated or breached.” Helms, 65 Ark. App. at 161, 986 S.W.2d at 422 (emphasis added).

A constructive trust arises when a party holds legal title for other persons. “A constructive trust is imposed where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.” Cox, 363 Ark. at 65, 210 S.W.3d at 848. In Cox, a constructive trust was imposed on real property held by Wava Cox that was the product of her extramarital affair with Walter Brassell. Id. at 57–58, 210 S.W.3d at 843–44. The Cox litigation was between Brassell’s estate, following his death, and Cox. “The duty to convey the property may arise because [of] . . . wrongful disposition of another’s property.” Id. at 65, 210 S.W.3d at 849. Although the timeliness of the estate’s litigation was not at issue in Cox, our supreme court held that the constructive trust arose when Cox refused to reconvey title to Brassell’s heirs within five months of his death. Id. at 58–59, 210 S.W.3d at 844.

Repudiation of the duty to reconvey begins the deadline to sue. Repudiation means the party holding legal title refuses to reconvey that title consistent with the prior agreement or duty to convey.

[I]t is contended that since the statute of limitations, in the absence of concealment, runs in favor of the trustee of a constructive trust, this suit is barred by the seven-year statute. The answer is that the constructive trust did not arise at the moment the deeds were executed. It is the transferee’s repudiation of his promise that brings the trust into being.

 

Walker, 225 Ark. at 657, 284 S.W.2d at 842 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (holding the limitations period began with Walker’s repudiation—when he “claim[ed] the land as his own”—after his sister’s death).

Similarly, in White v. White, 254 Ark. 257, 264, 493 S.W.2d 133, 138 (1973), two brothers, Daniel and Junior, received land from their father. Daniel then conveyed his interest to Junior as a loan, allowing Junior to use the land as collateral. Id. Junior was “obligated to reconvey the tract whenever Daniel requested.” Id. The brothers then treated the land as jointly owned for more than a decade. Junior repudiated that agreement when he claimed ownership of the land in his answer to Daniel’s complaint. Id. at 267, 493 S.W.2d at 139. The supreme court reversed the refusal to impose a constructive trust, finding the trust arose with Junior’s repudiation. Id.

And in Grissom v. Bunch, 227 Ark. 696, 703, 301 S.W.2d 462, 465–66 (1957), our supreme court held that a mother’s agreement to hold title to property for life for the benefit of her daughter was not repudiated “until her will was probated after her death in 1954; and limitations commenced at that time.” Id. Although the constructive trustee was dead, her repudiation occurred decades after the agreement, when her will was probated. Id.

And Gregory, supra, which George’s estate and James cited below, also supports the circuit court’s finding. In Gregory, Ms. Gregory deeded her property to her son, Mr. Gregory, on the promise he would divide the property among her children after her death. Gregory, 2013 Ark. App. 57, at 5, 425 S.W.3d at 848. In May 2009, Ms. Gregory demanded the return of her property after suspecting her son intended to keep the property for himself. Id. at 6, 425 S.W.3d at 849. Mr. Gregory refused and unsuccessfully raised the statute of limitations as a defense to Ms. Gregory’s suit. In concluding the action was timely brought, the court stated the following:

We also reject Mr. Gregory’s argument that Ms. Gregory’s action . . . was time-barred. . . . [I]n Davidson v. Sanders, [supra] the supreme court held that since it is the transferee’s repudiation of his oral promise that brings a constructive trust into being, the statute of limitations in favor of the constructive trustee cannot commence earlier than the date of such repudiation. Here the repudiation occurred in May 2009 when Mr. Gregory refused to return the property. . . . Ms. Gregory’s action was timely brought within three years in January 2011.

 

Id. at 7–8, 425 S.W.3d at 850 (emphasis added).

Arkansas appellate courts have held that these limitations-accrual cases require affirmative actions or words to repudiate an oral contract, thus triggering the running of the limitations period. Much as in Gregory, supra, George and James filed suit soon after Sharon repudiated Charles’s agreement to jointly own Bear Creek Farm. The common thread throughout these cases is some affirmative act or conduct violating the trustee’s agreement to hold legal title.

The only repudiation in the record before us was by Sharon in April 2020. To the extent the three brothers agreed to reconvey title to the Bear Creek Farm property after certain legal issues had been resolved, there is no evidence of a specific time limit imposed by their agreement. Moreover, there is no evidence that Charles ever refused to reconvey title or denied his joint ownership of the property with George and James. Instead, the brothers consistently acted as joint owners, recognizing that joint ownership until Charles’s death. Time was not of the essence in the Daniel brothers’ agreement, and they operated as co-equal joint owners for more than forty years consistent in their course of dealing.

Affirmative actions or words of repudiation are the standard. Neither Davidson nor Bramlett alters that holding in the Walker, Gregory, White, and Grissom cases. “The answer is that the constructive trust did not arise at the moment the deeds were executed. It is the transferee’s repudiation of his promise that brings the trust into being.” Walker, 225 Ark. at 657, 284 S.W.2d at 842 (emphasis added). Repudiation is the standard and requires more than mere inaction amidst brotherly cooperation.

The appellants ask us to hold that George’s and James’s causes of action accrued, and the limitations period began to run, when their legal problems resolved but Charles did not convey to them any interest in the Bear Creek Farm property. They submit that holding would support that George and James had a reasonable time to bring an action to enforce their rights yet would ensure that their claims were not stale. They maintain that the circuit court’s holding to the contrary does just the opposite and should be reversed.

This argument has no merit because it would trigger the running of the limitations period before the causes of action accrued. We acknowledge that statutes of limitation work in tandem with the equitable doctrine of laches in that they bar stale claims from being litigated and promote the efficient resolution of disputes before memories fade and witnesses die. That said, we hold those policy objectives are not offended by the constructive trust at issue.

The appellees note that equity steps into the gap when contracts fail to adequately address the parties’ agreement in full. See QHG of Springdale, Inc. v. Archer, 2009 Ark. App. 692, at 9–11, 373 S.W.3d 318, 324–25. Here, the evidence supports a conclusion (1) that the Daniel brothers agreed to buy the property together, (2) that they would own it jointly, and (3) that agreement over multiple decades of jointly operating and maintaining the property. Not until one brother died did his widow decided to discredit the existence of that agreement, which multiple witnesses—and a tape recording of the widow herself—acknowledged existed. We hold that there is no support for the argument that equity was ill served by remedying the unjust enrichment proposed by Sharon.

The record before us indicates that Sharon’s behavior was noted by the circuit court as deplorable, and such was reflected in the ruling from the bench to impose a constructive trust on the Bear Creek Farm property. The record is replete with evidence from multiple witnesses who confirmed that the Daniel brothers jointly owned the property at issue. The strongest evidence advanced by Sharon to support her refusal to acknowledge the Daniel brothers’ arrangement was to claim she knew nothing about it. When Sharon’s testimony at the trial contradicted her previously recorded incriminating statements, even she stopped short of claiming that Charles had ever expressly indicated that he owned all of the Bear Creek Farm property at any time during his life.

Imposing a constructive trust on property pursuant to a case filed one month after a widow repudiates her husband’s decades-long arrangement with his brothers is consistent case law policy. Constructive-trust accrual cases have imposed trusts after the death of one party, decades after the original agreement arose. See Walker; supra; White, supra; Grissom, supra. Waiting until an agreement is repudiated to commence limitations in these cases is consistent with previously discussed settled precedent.

By statute, no written documents are required to prove a constructive trust between persons in a confidential relationship, like that of the Daniel brothers. See White, 254 Ark. at 266–67, 493 S.W.2d at 139. Our review of the record reveals evidence to support the circuit court’s imposition of a constructive trust, including writings in Charles’s authenticated handwriting noting his joint ownership with George and James.

While the discussion above focuses on the point at which the limitations period began to run, we next review the determination of the applicable limitations period. Two statutes of limitation arguably apply. The first is the limitations period for bringing an action for breach of an oral contract, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-56-105(1) (Repl. 2005). That statue requires those actions to be brought within three years of the time the cause of action accrues. According to the appellants, if George’s and James’s causes of action accrued as of the time their legal troubles resolved, requiring Charles to convey their interest in the Bear Creek Farm property to them around 1982, any cause of action for breach of an oral contract had to have been brought by the end of 1985. They note that George and James did not file this case until mid-2020.

The other statute of limitations that is arguably applicable is the one governing actions to recover lands, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-61-101(a)(1) (Repl. 2015). It would require George and James to bring their case within seven years of the accrual of their causes of action. Again, using the appellants’ arguably relevant point in time, about 1982, any cause of action to recover their respective interests in the land would have had to have been brought by the end of 1989—long before 2020. Thus, under either statute, they contend that George and James’s complaint was time-barred.

We acknowledge that Arkansas appellate courts have applied the three-year statute of limitations to unjust-enrichment claims imposing a constructive trust. See, e.g., Gregory, 2013 Ark. App. 57, at 8, 425 S.W.3d at 850. And the seven-year limitations period may also apply to claims for recovering an interest in real property. Ark. Code Ann. § 18-61-101(a)(1); see, e.g., Walker, 225 Ark. at 657, 284 S.W.2d at 842.

This disposition of this appeal turns on the date that George’s and James’s claims accrued, not the deadline triggered by that accrual. We hold that the evidence before us supports the circuit court’s finding that their claims accrued in April 2020 when Sharon repudiated Charles’s agreement with George and James. Accordingly, George’s and James’s claims would be considered timely under either potentially applicable deadline.

Affirmed.

Gruber and Barrett, JJ., agree.

Hyden, Miron & Foster, PLLC, by: Guy W. Murphy, Jr., and Sam Patterson; and Brian G. Brooks, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brian G. Brooks, for appellants.

Morgan Law Firm, P.A., by: Nathan S. Morgan; and Blair & Stroud, by: Barrett S. Moore, for appellees.