2011 Ark. App. 468 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CACR 10-341 CHARLES LANELL WILLIAJv1S APPELLANT V. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge This no-merit appea) comes before this court a second time. Lanell Williams, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault on a family or household member, and was sentenced to six years in prison with a five-year enhancement because the assault was co:rnrnltted in the presence of his four-year-old son. which was accompanied by a motion to withdraw, appellant's counsel discussed all but one of the adverse rulings and provided sufficient explanations as to why those rulings could not support a meritorious appeal. Mr. Williams initially declined to file any prose points. In our first opiruon, we ordered Mr. Williams's counsel to rebriefthe case and discuss the remaining adverse ruling, which was the trial court's denial of counsel's request co concurrently with the prison sentence he was already serving. Ark. App. 35. Opinion Delivered JUNE 29, 2011 APPEAL FROM THE CLARK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, [NO. CR-09-94] HONORABLE ROBERT E. MCCALLUM, JUDGE AFFIRMED The appellant, Charles In the first no-merit brief, run his sentence See Williams v. State, 2011
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The supreme court has repeatedly held that there is no rule that requires a trial court to <:.et forth in writing that it exercised discretion, nor is there a requirement that the court explain its reason for running sentences consecutively. Applying these p1;nc1ples to the presenr case, we agree chat any challenge on appeal rn the trial court's exercise of its discretion in chis regard would be fiivolous. Upon rebriefing the case, Mr. Williams's counsel has also discussed a defense objection raised during the Stace's closing argument. During closing argument, the appellant objected to the prosecutor's mischaracterization of c:he injuries inflicted on the victim. This objection was effectively sustained and did noc resulc: in an adverse ruling because the trial court gave curative relief, 1nstructing the jury that closing remarks were not evidence and that the jurors should rely on their understanding of the facts in evidence. We now cum t0 the pro se points submitted by Mr. Williams. For his first point, f'vlr. Williams complains about the fact that he was in shackles while being transported co and from the courtroom. He cites Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005), where the supreme court held that courts may not routinely place defendants in visible restraints during the guilt or penalty phase of the trial, that shackJ.jng must be specifically justified by the circumstances, and that no showing of prejudice is required co make our a due-process violation from i:he roucine use of visible shackles. The case at bar is distinguishable from Deck, supra, because che triaJ court specifically gave the justification that Mr. Williams was presencly an inmate on oilier charges and char the present charges arose from an attack on his wife during her visitation with him in the ja11. -3-
For security purposes, Mr. Williams was escorted to and from the courthouse in shackles, but rhe shackles were not to be viewed by the jury. had seen him shack.Jed during a recess, we noted in our first legicimace security risk and, because the evidence of appellant's guile was overwhelming and a video of the attack was played to the jury, observation of che shackles affected the outcome of che trial. review of the case that this presents no grounds for a merit appeal, and that holding is now the law of the case. In his remaining pro se points, Mr. Williams directs us to testimony during the guilt phase that he did not stab the victim, and testimony during the sentencing phase that he had been a. good prisoner up umil the day he actacked his wife. chaJlenging che sufficiency of the evidence, we explained in our first opinion that substantial evidence supports the verdict, as was asserted by appellam's counsel. him being a good prisoner was offered for sentencing purposes, and it did not constitute an adverse ruling. Moreover, it cannot be a basis for reversal given char the sentence returned by che jury was well within the permissible sentencing range. App. 591. Based on our review of the record and there has been compliance with Rule 4-3(k)(1) Consequently, appellant's counsel's motion to be relieved is granted and the judgment is affirmed. -4-Despite appellam's claim below rhat the jury opinion thac there was a there was no indication that the jury's We thus held during our first To the extent Mr. Williams is The testimony about See Dooly v. State, 2010 Ark. che briefs presented, we conclude thac and that the appeal is without merit.
Affirmed. GR.UBER and ABR..A.MSON, JJ., agree. -5-
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