CAMPBELL V. ENTERGY ARK , INC ARK API)] c ite as 8 c i Ark App 01 (2004) 91 Wendell CAMPBELL ENTERGY ARKANSAS, INC. CA 04-285 200 S W3c1473 Court of Appeals of Arkansas Opinion delivered December 15, 2004 [Rehearing denied January 19, 2005 ] STATUTES — CONSTRUCTION — BASIC RULES — The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly, in considering the meaning of a statute, the appellate court construes it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language, if the language is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory crinstrUctloll WORDS & PHRASES — SHALL MANDATORY — The word "shall" is considered mandatory: 3 JUR, / — APPELLANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO ARGUE EFFECT OF ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES TO JURY — CASE REVERSED & REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL — Because Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-64-122(d) (Supp 2003), provides, "In cases where the issue of comparative fault is submitted to the jury by an interrogatory, counsel for the parties shall be permitted to argue to the jury the effect of an answer to any interrogatory," appellant should have been permitted to argue the effect of the answers to
LAMPLILLL EN1LILGV AP-K 90 Cite as 89 Ark: App 91 (2004) [89 interrogatones to the jury, and it was error for the trial court CO submit the case on interrogatones without allowing appellant further argument, accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial Appeal from Arkansas Circuit Court David G. Henry, Judge, reversed and remanded, Howell, Trice, Hope & Files, PA:,by:Jason Files, Eubanks, Baker & Schulze, by:] C. Schultze, for appellant: Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: Scott]: Lancaster, for appellee: NDREE LAYTON ROAF, Judge In this negligence case, A appellant Wendell Campbell sued Entergy Arkansas, Inc: after receiving an electrical shock from an Entergy guy wire. Camp-bell argued that Entergy's negligence was the cause ofhis injuries, and Entergy argued that Campbell's own negligence caused his injuries. The case was initially submitted to the jury on a general-verdict instruction After the jury expressed confusion about comparative fault, the trial court resubmitted the case on special interrogatones: The jury apportioned fault between Campbell and Entergy fifty-fifty, which resulted in a verdict for Entergy On appeal, Campbell argues that the trial court erred when it submitted the case on special interrogatones because he was not allowed to argue the effect of the comparative-fault special interrogatory We agree, and reverse and remand Because Campbell does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, a long recitation of the facts is not necessary to an understanding of the issue on appeal While doing yard work at his residence on August 15, 2001, Campbell came in contact with a guy wire, which Entergy owned, installed, and maintained He suffered an electrical shock: Campbell sued Entergy, alleging that Entergy's negligenLe in Lonstructing and maintaining the electrical wire caused his injury: Entergy denied fault for Campbell's injuries, and expert testimony was presented supporting Entergy's theory of the case: Following the jury's instructions, the parties presented closing arguments: At the close of the arguments, the case was submitted to the jury on a general verdict: After the jury retired to deliberate, it returned to the courtroom without having reached a verdict The foreperson stated that the jury was hung six to six:
CAMPBELL V, ENTERGY ARK , INC ARK AK' I Cite as 89 Ark App 91 120041 93 The trial court gave a further instruction, encouraging the jury to continue deliberating in an effort to reach a verdict The jury again retired to deliberate: Subsequently, the jury presented a question to the trial court: It asked, "What verdict form do we use for a fifty-fifty verdict?" Neither the trial court nor the attorneys understood whether the jury meant that it was still tied six to six, or whether they were attempting to apportion fault between the parties. The trial court sent a written response, indicating, "The Court needs clarification: Is the question that you are deadlocked 50% to 50% or 6 to 6 or; Have you determined that both the plaintiff - and the defendant are each 50% responsible for the accident:" The jury circled the portion of the question that stated, "Have you determined that both the plaintiff and the defendant are each 50% responsible for the accident," and wrote at the bottom of the note, "This is our position:" The trial court wrote back, "The way your question must be answered is to refer to instruction 'AMI 2101 — Comparative Negligence or Fault — Claim by one plaintiff— No Counterclaim' and be guided accordingly " The jury then responded, "The way these forms are typed there is no way to compare percentages," and the trial court responded. "You are not required to assess percentages of negligence on the verdict form itself But to use those percentages you reach to choose the correct verdict form according to 2101:" After some time. the jur y returned with yet another question: The trial court opined to the attorneys that it believed that the jury had decided that fault should be apportioned between the parties fifty-fifty, that it would be silly to require the jury to continue in this manner; and that he was submitting the case on interrogatories: Campbell objected to the submission of the case on interrogatories, asserting that the parties were not given the chance to present closing arguments on the interrogatories, but stated that if the trial court submitted the interrogatory, it should submit the entire instruction. Following the preparation of the interrogatories, the jury was called back into the courtroom for further instruction: The case was submitted to the jury on interrogatories. and the jury, by apportioning fault fifty-fifty, returned a verdict in Entergy's favor, Campbell appeals: Campbell argues that the trial court erred by submitting the case on interrogatories after the parties had presented closing arguments, thereby preventing him from arguing the effect of An
CAMPBELL P. ENTERGY ARK , INC 94 Cite as 89 Ark App 91 (2004) [89 answer to any interrogatory as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-64-122(d) (Supp: 2003): [1, 2] The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly, Madden v: Aldrith, 346 Ark 405, 58 S,W,3d 342 (2001): In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language: Id. If the language is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction: Id; see also Rathbun v: Ward, 315 Ark, 264, 866 S,W,2d 403 (1993). Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-64- 122(d) provides, "In cases where the issue of comparative fault is submitted to the jury by an interrogatory, counsel for the parties shall be permitted to argue to the jury the effect of an answer to any interrogatory."' (Emphasis added.) The word "shall" is considered mandatory. Middleton v. Lockhart, 344 Ark. 572, 43 S.W.3d 113 (2001): [3] Consequently, Campbell should have been permitted to argue the effect of the answers to the interrogatories to the jury, and it was error for the trial court to submit the case on interrogatories without allowing Campbell further argument: Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial: Reversed and remanded, PITTMAN and CRABTREE, agree. ' We are mindful of the supreme court's holding in Argo 1_, Bladeshear,242 Ark 817,416 S W2d 314 (1967), which states that it is reversible error for the trial judge to inform the jury as to the effect of their amwers to interrogatories where jurors apportioned fault 50%-50%, between the parties, because it undermined the intent to elicit the j uror's unbiased judgment on 1.55 ues of fact However,Ark Code Ann 5 16-64-122(d), which permits counsel to inform the jury of the effect of their answers to interrogatories, was enacted after the decision in Argo supra We are also aware that the federal courts have refused to apply subsection (d), finding that it conflicts with Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern submission of cases on special interrogatories, and that it nullifies the trial court's reasons for submitting the case on special verdict We attempted to certify this case to the supreme court, however the supreme court declined to accept it
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